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Hawkins

THE LONG ARC OF DIVERSITY BENDS TOWARDS EQUALITY:
DECONSTRUCTING THE PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE OF WORKPLACE
DIVERSITY EFFORTS
Stacy L. Hawkins
ABSTRACT
Workplace diversity efforts have many critics. More notable perhaps than
the attack from the right in the form of legal challenges alleging workplace
diversity efforts amount to reverse discrimination is the normative critique of
workplace diversity efforts from the left. Progressive responses to workplace
diversity efforts range from cautious ambivalence to highly suspicious. This
article deconstructs this progressive critique of workplace diversity efforts
and in the process identifies two primary strands of opposition, one
principled and the other practical. The article responds to this critique by
situating workplace diversity efforts within the context of their equal
employment opportunity origins and by highlighting their beneficial effects
for women and racial minorities. This response reveals the true progressive
concern as less about how workplace diversity efforts are justified in
principle than about how they might operate in practice. Taking this
pragmatic concern seriously, this article relies on theories of law and
organizational theory to suggest that Title VII law and doctrine should be
interpreted and applied by courts in response to workplace diversity efforts
in ways that promote their equality-enhancing effects and otherwise restrict
their potential to incur the kinds of practical harms that most concern
progressive scholars.
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“The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
A person of color is photo-shopped into an otherwise all-white
brochure touting an institutional commitment to diversity. 1 A Black
employee who lives in an all-white suburban neighborhood is forced
to commute across town to manage a store in an urban Black
neighborhood. 2 One candidate is selected over another of the same
race because he is less “ethnic.”3 These hypotheticals exemplify the
claim often made by many “progressive” scholars 4 that workplace
diversity efforts 5 (“WDE”) are more harmful to those who ought
1

Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2153 (2013).
JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 87 (2013).
3
DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 136–38 (2013) (this example has been modified slightly
from the original to conform to the hypothetical presented at the end of this article,
see infra Part IV.B.1.).
4
The term “progressive” has been used in the legal literature to denote a scholar who
advocates for social justice through liberal interpretation of laws bearing on equal
opportunity for underrepresented groups, including in particular women and racial
minorities. See Soohan Kim et al., Progressive Corporations at Work: The Case of
Diversity Programs, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 171, 175 (2012). In the
context of Title VII, “progressive” scholars include those who advocate for
affirmative action in employment. Id. The term “progressive” is admittedly
imprecise in designating a wide-ranging group of scholars. Id. However, this term is
used herein as a shorthand because of its common association with this broad liberal
or progressive ideology. See Jack R. Weinstein, On the Meaning of the Term
Progressive: A Philosophical Investigation, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 49–50
(2006). Despite the disagreement with the general progressive critique of WDE
expressed herein, I consider this article a contribution to that body of progressive
scholarship. The disagreement is a matter of means, not disagreement with the end of
achieving social justice on behalf of women and racial minorities.
5
WDE can involve a wide range of activities, including recruitment and hiring of
diverse employees, managing supplier diversity initiatives, and sponsoring employee
affinity groups, among other things. See Stacy Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of
Diversity: Moving Beyond the Affirmative Action Debate to Embrace a Twenty-First
Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75, 82 (2012) [hereinafter
Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity] (describing modern workplace
diversity efforts). These efforts are most often motivated by instrumental business
concerns rather than remedial or egalitarian concerns. See id , 84-90 (describing
these instrumental concerns as leveraging cultural competence, increasing innovation
and demonstrating social responsibility). The focus here is exclusively on those
2
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instead to be its beneficiaries, and therefore these efforts ought to be
condemned in principle and/or curtailed in practice. 6 It is true that
WDE can sometimes go awry in practice, causing unintended and in
some cases even harmful consequences, as demonstrated by these
examples.7 However the progressive critique of WDE as problematic
in principle or deserving of categorical rebuke ignores the many ways
they foster equal opportunities in the workplace, particularly for
women and racial minorities.8 These equality-enhancing effects, often
ignored or minimized in these critiques, have become all the more
important for promoting the workplace interests of women and racial
minorities as robust enforcement of anti-discrimination laws designed
to curb workplace discrimination has waned in recent years.9
This article responds to the progressive critique of WDE by
suggesting a more hopeful consideration of their potential to aid in the
progressive project of transforming workplaces from places of
inequality into places of both diversity and equality. In other words,
despite some occasional missteps, if we were to follow the long arc of
WDE, we would find that, on the whole, they do in fact move
workplaces towards equality rather than away from it. Therefore,
WDE that are directed towards employees and that might implicate employer
liability under prevailing anti-discrimination law. Although some might elide the
distinction between WDE and affirmative action, this conflation misses the mark
between these two distinct phenomena both as a matter of legal and practical
significance. See infra Parts II.A.1–2.; see also Stacy Hawkins, How Diversity Can
Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard: Mounting an Effective Title VII Defense
of the Commitment to Diversity in the Legal Profession, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2457,
2460 n.9 (2015) [hereinafter Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell
Douglas Standard] (discussing the difference in treatment under Title VII of WDE
and remedial affirmative action plans). Thus, throughout this article, the term WDE
signifies instrumental workplace diversity efforts and is used in contrast with
remedial affirmative action.
6
See infra Part III.A.
7
See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
8
See infra Part II.B. All references herein are to race and/or racial minorities.
However, it is acknowledged that many of the same issues involving race and/or
racial minorities addressed herein could equally apply to ethnicity and/or ethnic
minorities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2012) (acknowledging that Title VII protects
workplace discrimination on the basis of national origin to the same extent it protects
race and gender discrimination).
9
See infra Part III.C.
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rather than the broad, principled rejection of WDE found in the
literature, progressive scholars ought to seek productive ways to
leverage the equality-enhancing potential of these efforts by focusing
the critique more narrowly on those practical aspects of WDE that
might have equality-suppressing effects. This paper outlines that more
targeted normative approach.
This article is divided into three parts. Part One provides a
primer on WDE, emphasizing in particular the points of divergence,
and a critical point of alignment, with traditional, remedial affirmative
action. 10 The account of WDE provided highlights the erroneous
assumptions that lay hidden beneath the surface of the progressive
critique, as well as the unacknowledged benefits generated by WDE
for women and racial minorities in particular.11
Part Two first synthesizes then deconstructs the progressive
critique based on this fuller account of WDE. This part reveals that
these efforts are more allied with the equality goals underlying Title
VII than the progressive critique admits, suggesting the possibility that
WDE might prove more helpful in the cause to advance workplace
equality on behalf of women and racial minorities than this critique
acknowledges.12
Finally, Part Three addresses some of the legitimate practical
concerns raised by the progressive critique of WDE. Drawing on
theories of law and organizational theory that explain how Title VII
law has responded to these efforts to date, this Part offers some
prescriptions for how Title VII law and doctrine can be interpreted and
applied in response to WDE to ensure its continued alignment with the
equality goals underlying Title VII.13
I.

WORKPLACE DIVERSITY VS. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A PRIMER

WDE are characterized by policies and practices designed to
expand opportunities for and inclusion of all persons in the workplace,
10

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
12
See infra Part III.A–C.
13
See infra Part IV.A–B.
11
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but they especially target those persons who are, or traditionally have,
been underrepresented, such as women and racial minorities. 14
Accounts differ about the exact origins of WDE, but there is universal
agreement that they have proliferated over the last several decades.15
In their earliest form WDE were more closely and explicitly aligned
with equal employment opportunity (EEO) compliance, but as they
expanded WDE have transcended these EEO origins.16 Having once
been justified largely in terms of EEO compliance, WDE are now
pursued predominantly for instrumental business reasons.17
A.

Diversity & Affirmative Action: Materially Different But
Critically Aligned

Importantly, WDE differ materially from traditional
affirmative action plans. 18 The most widely-cited difference is that
14

See, e.g., Inclusion at Starbucks, STARBUCKS.COM,
http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community/diversity-and-inclusion (last
visited Dec. 29, 2016). In this way, WDE resemble the pursuit of student body
diversity. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (discussing the
fact that while the university recognizes “many possible bases for diversity
admissions,” there is “special reference to the inclusion…of African-Americans,
Hispanic and Native American[] [students who otherwise] might not be represented
in [the] student body in meaningful numbers.”).
15
Compare Kim et. al, supra note 4, at 186 (claiming, as is often cited, that WDE
date to the 1980s), with Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental
Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L.
REV. 677, 704 (2004) (claiming that WDE emerged as early as the late 1960s). See,
e.g., Patrick S. Shin and Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017,
1049 (2011) (noting it is “beyond doubt” that “diversity initiatives on the part of
private employers have expanded over the past few decades.”).
16
See infra Part II.A.3.
17
Id.
18
Although some scholars treat WDE as merely one form of affirmative action, see,
e.g., Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justification and Workplace Affirmative
Action, 43 BRANDEIS L. J. 199, 233–34 (2005) (referring to the instrumental
diversity rationale as a form of “private affirmative action”), others have defined
affirmative action as distinctly remedial in nature, and distinguishable from WDE,
see, e.g., Monique C. Lillard et al., The Effects of the University of Michigan Cases
on Affirmative Action in Employment: Proceedings of the 2004 Annual Meeting,
Association of American Law Schools, Sections on Employment Discrimination,
Labor Relations and Employment Law and Minority Groups, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 127, 146 (2004) (noting “I have not seen a Supreme Court decision yet that
gives us a definition of what affirmative action is…[but] I tend to think about
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WDE are justified by forward-looking, instrumental rationales;
whereas traditional affirmative action plans are justified by a
backward-looking, remedial rationale.19 Another significant distinction
between the two is the difference between the explicit racial and
gender preferences emblematic of traditional affirmative action plans
and the inexplicit race- and gender-consciousness of WDE. 20 These
are important and often overlooked distinctions.21 But WDE’s origins
in EEO compliance offers a critical point of alignment with
affirmative action that similarly goes unacknowledged in the
progressive critique.22
EEO compliance arises out of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
race and gender, among other things. 23 Enacted against the historic
affirmative action in terms of a plan that takes race and sex into account as one
factor as a remedy for past, present, or continuing discrimination.”).
19
See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 79 (“Suddenly
corporations were awash in diversity programming focused on diversity recruiting
and hiring, affinity groups, and supplier diversity initiatives, among other things.”);
see also Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 215, 216–17
(2004) [hereinafter Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work] (describing the diversity
rationale as instrumental and forward-looking rather than remedial and backwardlooking); Corey Ciocchetti & John Holcomb, The Frontier of Affirmative Action:
Employment Preferences & Diversity in the Private Workplace, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
283, 320–21 (2010) (distinguishing between the remedial rationale and the “forwardlooking” diversity rationale); Helen Norton, Stepping Through Grutter’s Open
Doors: What the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases Mean for RaceConscious Government Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 543, 545–46 (2005)
(describing the “forward-looking” and “instrumental” rationales of diversity as
contrasting with the “moral justification” of remediation underlying affirmative
action).
20
See infra Part II.A.2.
21
Id.
22
See infra Part II.A.3. Even the EEOC has acknowledged the nature of both these
differences and this critical alignment between diversity and the workplace equality
goals of Title VII. EEOC DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL 915.003: EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 12-I: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION (2008).
2323 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). Title VII also prohibits discrimination in
employment based on color, national origin and religion. Id. Other legal bases exist
for enforcing the guarantee of non-discrimination in employment, including Section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (which governs racial discrimination only) and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Although these other laws
raise legitimate concerns for their application to WDE, treatment of WDE under
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backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement, and with the goal of ending
Jim Crow segregation in the American workplace, it is no surprise that
Title VII is believed to embody not just a general prohibition on
discrimination in hiring and employment on the bases proscribed by
the statute, but also a normative commitment to ensuring workplace
equality for women and racial minorities specifically.24 It is this latter
goal that progressive scholars believe WDE frustrate, or even betray.25
1.

Instrumental Diversity & Remedial Affirmative Action

In contrast with Title VII’s indisputably remedial purpose to
correct and prevent workplace discrimination, 26 modern WDE are,
more often than not, justified in instrumental business terms such as:
(1) ensuring responsiveness to culturally diverse markets, (2)
improving performance through innovation; and (3) signaling the
openness of the workplace to both internal (employees) and external
(customers/other stakeholders) audiences. 27 Sociologist and selfSection 1981 and the Equal Protection Clause is beyond the scope of this article. For
a discussion of the interaction between WDE adjudicated under Title VII and those
adjudicated under the equal protection clause, see Hawkins, How Diversity Can
Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra n. 5 at 2465, n. 41 (noting “courts
have often treated [workplace discrimination] claims arising under both Title VII and
equal protection doctrine the same.”).
24
See generally J. EDWARD KELLOUGH, UNDERSTANDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
POLITICS, DISCRIMINATION AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (2006) (discussing the
history of affirmative action in the public and private sectors including its legal
aspects)
25
See infra Part II.A.1.
26
See generally KELLOUGH, supra note 24.
27
See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 84–90
(discussing each of these instrumental interests and designating them the
business, functional and social responsibility rationales respectively). This
emphasis on instrumental goals does not mean that WDE are not, or cannot
be, justified in moral, remedial, or social justice terms as well, or motivated in
part by these concerns. Id. There is, for instance, in the legal profession, an
ongoing debate about the competing force of the “business case” versus the
“moral case.” See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell
Douglas Standard, supra note 5, at 2459. Additionally, many modern
corporate diversity programs are aligned with their corporate social
responsibility efforts, demonstrating that businesses recognize both the
instrumental and social value of WDE. See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense
of Diversity, supra note 5, at 88. Increasingly, however, the “business cases”
has come to dominate the managerial rhetoric regarding the value of WDE.
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described progressive John Skrentny denotes the difference between
WDE and affirmative action as one between an employer’s belief in
“racial realism” (i.e., WDE) and its commitment to “affirmative action
liberalism” (i.e., affirmative action).28 Skrentny identifies two different
strands of racial realism or WDE: (1) a belief in “racial abilities,” and
(2) a commitment to “racial signaling.”29 The racial abilities strand of
racial realism parallels WDE’s instrumental concerns for responding
to diverse markets and improving business innovation. 30 The racial
signaling strand aligns with WDE’s instrumental concern for signaling
the openness of the workplace. 31 Skrentny contrasts the “racial
realism” associated with WDE with the more approving “affirmative
action liberalism,” which emphasizes redressing inequality and
ensuring equal opportunities.32 This perceived fundamental disjunction
between WDE on the one hand and affirmative action on the other
hand reflects the broader progressive critique of WDE as diametrical
to the goal of workplace equality.33
WDE are not, however, antagonistic to the goal of workplace
equality; to the contrary, they are allied with that goal.34 A statement
on Starbucks’ corporate website reflects and underscores how WDE
and their instrumental goals transcend, without diminishing, the goal
of equal opportunity:
At the heart of our business, we seek to inspire and
nurture the human spirit - understanding that each
See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
28
SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 3.
29
Id. at 11.
30
Id. According to Skrentny, “racial abilities” refers to the productive use of race
through the “common [practice] of racial matching…when it comes to dealing with
clients or citizens of the concordant race” or for creating racially diverse groups to
“generate more ideas and thus more innovation, more productivity, and better overall
performance.” Id.
31
Id. at 13. Skrentny defines “racial signaling” as the use of race to “gain a favorable
response from an audience through the strategic deployment of an employee’s race.”
Id.
32
Id. at 6.
33
See infra Part III.A.1–2; see also Stephen M. Rich, What Diversity Contributes to
Equal Opportunity, S. CAL. L. REV. 2 (forthcoming 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2620545 (positing that instrumental diversity is
“orthogonal, or even hostile to equality”).
34
See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
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person brings a distinct life experience to the table.
Our partners are diverse not only in gender, race,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, religion and
age, but also in cultural backgrounds, life experiences,
thoughts and ideas.
Embracing diversity only enhances our work culture, it
also drives our business success. It is the inclusion of
these diverse experiences and perspectives that create
a culture of empowerment, one that fosters innovation,
economic growth and new ideas.35
As this statement demonstrates, despite deliberate attention to racial
and gender inclusion in the workforce, contemporary WDE often do
not directly seek to realize Title VII’s remedial goal of redressing
workplace inequality. 36 They emphasize instrumental business
concerns. 37 Nevertheless, these efforts do promote more inclusive
work cultures and foster greater workplace equality. 38
2.

Race & Gender Conscious, NOT Racial & Gender Preferences

Another material difference between WDE and affirmative
action is that WDE are merely race- and gender-conscious, but
employment decisions need not and ought not be based expressly on
the race or gender of candidates.39 By contrast affirmative action is
typified by explicit racial and gender preferences.40 The progressive
critique elides this important distinction, but it has material
consequences for how WDE ought to be administered in practice and
how they are treated in law.41
35

See Inclusion at Starbucks, STARBUCKS.COM,
http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community/diversity-and-inclusion (last
visited Dec. 29, 2016).
36
See supra note 19 (distinguishing between the remedial goals of affirmative action
and the instrumental goals of WDE).
37
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38
See infra Part II.B.
39
See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
40
See infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
41
See infra Part III.A.
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Traditional, remedial affirmative action plans are most often
associated with racial and gender preferences, as exemplified in the
seminal Title VII cases United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber 42 and
Johnson v. Transportation Agency. 43 Weber approved of a union
training program that reserved half of the available training slots for
Black steelworkers in an attempt to remedy past discrimination in the
union trades. 44 In sustaining this training program against challenge,
the Supreme Court held that Title VII permits employers to adopt
voluntary affirmative action plans that involve explicit racial
preferences when they serve to remedy past discrimination by
eliminating a “manifest racial imbalance” in the workforce. 45
Subsequently, in Johnson the Supreme Court upheld affirmative action
plans involving explicit gender preferences.46
By contrast WDE do not depend on, and ought not involve,
explicit racial or gender preferences.47 Rather, WDE entail race- and

42

443 U.S. 193 (1979).
480 U.S. 616 (1987).
44
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
45
Id.
46
See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641–42. In Johnson, a male challenged the
promotion of a female and the employer defended the selection on the ground
that the employer was operating pursuant to an affirmative action plan
designed to cure a gender imbalance in its workforce. Id. The Court approved
the affirmative action plan based on the gender imbalance of the workforce,
i.e., none of the positions in the job category were held by women. Id. at 637–
38. The EEOC ultimately issued regulatory guidance for employers on how to
take advantage of the “safe harbor” established under Title VII when adopting
voluntary affirmative action plans pursuant to the standards articulated in
Weber and Johnson. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608 et seq. (setting forth the regulations
for voluntary affirmative action); see also EEOC DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL
915.003: EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15-VI.C: RACE AND COLOR
DISCRIMINATION (2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf.
47
See infra note 49 and accompanying text. Nor are they race and gender exclusive.
See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 82. This broad
scope raises another progressive objection to WDE, i.e., that they dilute the focus on
workplace equality for women and racial minorities. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke,
Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J.
1219 (2011) (addressing the issue from a feminist perspective on workplace
protections for women). Responding to that objection is beyond the scope of this
paper, but it is notable that WDE still generate workplace equality benefits for
43
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gender-conscious efforts designed to increase the presence of various
underrepresented groups in the workplace, including specifically
women and racial minorities, as well as ensure a more inclusive work
culture as a means of leveraging this diversity and inclusion for
instrumental benefit. 48 Notwithstanding their race- and genderconsciousness, properly administered WDE are careful to avoid
explicit racial and gender preferences, or any efforts that may be
exclusionary rather than inclusionary. 49 Creating both more diverse
and more inclusive workplaces is, after all, the means by which
employers realize the instrumental benefits of WDE.50
3.

A Common Origin in EEO Compliance

Despite these material differences, affirmative action and WDE
do have a critical point of alignment.51 WDE, like remedial affirmative
action plans, have origins in the management of EEO compliance.52
Although some scholars date the origins of WDE as far back as the

women and racial minorities specifically despite their broad scope. See infra Part
II.B.
48
See supra note 27. In fact, when WDE employ explicit racial and gender
preferences they are most likely to go awry and create the kinds of unintended
consequences that most concern progressive scholars. See infra Part III.A.2.
49
Compare Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a
reverse discrimination challenge to the employer’s workplace diversity plan
where the plan prohibited decision-makers from expressly considering race or
gender in individual hiring or promotion decisions even though it encouraged
and rewarded managers for their efforts to improve workplace diversity), with
Decorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming a jury verdict in
favor of the white plaintiff challenging a diversity plan and finding it was not
error for the trial court to treat the diversity plan as an invalid affirmative
action plan where the employer used racial preferences in an attempt to
achieve a desired racial balance within the workforce). For a fuller discussion
of why racial and gender preferences ought not be employed as a part of
WDE, see Hawkins, supra note 5, at 2478–79.
50
See generally Michalle E. Mor Barak, Inclusion Is the Key to Diversity
Management, But What Is Inclusion?, 39 HUM. SERV. ORGS.: MGMT., LEAD. &
GOVERNANCE 83 (2015).
51
See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
52
For a general discussion of the history and origins of WDE, including their
relation to the EEOC, see Kim et al., supra note 4; see also Hawkins, A Deliberative
Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 80–81.
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1960’s,53 the more common account locates the origins of WDE in the
1980’s. 54 As administrative enforcement and attention to EEO
compliance under Title VII waned during the Reagan Administration,
human resources professionals “rebranded the programs they had built
for EEO compliance as part of a new ‘diversity management’
initiative.” 55 These nascent diversity efforts, initially designed to
sustain EEO compliance, were soon bolstered in their importance
when the “mega” discrimination cases of the 1990’s demonstrated the
huge liability corporations could face for failing to adequately prevent
workplace discrimination,56 and as the business management literature
began to offer empirical proof that diverse, heterogeneous workforces
were better for business than non-diverse, homogenous ones.57
These factors, coupled with the growing demographic diversity
of the labor force and the globalization of economic markets that made
cultural competence an indispensable skill in the twenty-first century
workforce, 58 caused WDE to transcend their origins in EEO
53

See, e.g., Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 15, at 7 (arguing that WDE emerged as
early as the late 1960’s in response to the race riots).
54
See Kim et al., supra note 4, at 173 (explaining that while companies began
recruiting women and minorities in the 1960s, formal diversity programs did not
emerge until the 1980s).
55
Id. at 186. Coincidentally, due to the political appointment of federal judges, this
shift in the political climate might also explain the judicial retrenchment on robust
remedial enforcement of Title VII. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
56
See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 81–82
(describing the 1996 $176.1 million Texaco settlement and the ensuing 1999 $192
million Coca-Cola settlement of race discrimination charges as watershed events that
precipitated the rapid rise of the diversity movement in corporate America); see also
Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49
B.C. L. REV. 367, 367–68 (2008) (describing the proliferation of diversity initiatives
after settlement through consent decree of “megacases” of employment
discrimination).
57
See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 86 (describing
the emergence of the business and functional cases for diversity). For a fuller
discussion of the functional benefit, see SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE
POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS AND SOCIETIES
(2008) (demonstrating empirical link between diversity, including social identity
diversity such as race and gender, and work tasks such as problem-solving and
prediction that allows diversity to be a value-added benefit in the workplace).
58
In 1987, the Hudson Institute released its influential publication, Workforce 2000,
predicting the rapid diversification of the American labor force. See Frymer &
Skrentny, supra note 15, at 705–06. See also Brief for 65 Leading American
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compliance and develop into the instrumentally-justified and widelyembraced management practices they have become today.59 WDE are
now largely justified in instrumental terms, rather than by the legal
compliance justifications that characterized their EEO origins. 60 But
this does not mean that instrumental WDE have become completely
unmoored from these EEO origins. 61 They continue to make
workplaces more equitable and inclusive even as they have become
increasingly justified in instrumental terms.62 In fact, it may be that
the instrumental value for workplace diversity has become dominant,
not in spite of, but because of its ability to remain allied with
diversity’s broader equality origins, making WDE consonant with
rather than antagonistic to the equality goals underlying Title VII.63
B.

Diversity Fosters Workplace Equality

This fuller account of WDE’s origins and operation, often
unacknowledged in the progressive critique, demonstrates how WDE
Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516) [hereinafter Brief for 65 Leading American
Businesses] (arguing that the skills needed in the increasingly global economy
included cultural competence).
59
See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 80–82; see also
Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106
AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1590 (2001) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the
Managerialization of Law] (describing how WDEs both evolved out of and have
helped influence EEO compliance). The proliferation of WDEs was also no doubt
spurred by endorsement from the EEOC, the administrative agency charged with
enforcement of Title VII. See EEOC DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL, supra note 46
(approving of “diversity efforts designed to open up opportunities to everyone”).
60
See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6 (2005)
[hereinafter Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work] (observing that “the public posture of
[employers] has shifted over the last few decades away from [EEO] compliance and
social justice and toward ‘diversity’” and achieving its “economic benefits.”).
61
See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
62
See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard,
supra note 5, at 2459 (discussing the debate between the “moral case” and the
“business case” for diversity in the legal profession). Employers commonly
reference these equal opportunity and inclusion goals alongside the instrumental
goals. See id. Employers commonly reference these equal opportunity and inclusion
goals alongside the instrumental goals. See id.
63
See infra Part III.A.1.
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and affirmative action efforts are aligned.64 Moreover, there is ample
evidence that WDE do promote workplace equality for women and
racial minorities despite their express goal of improving business
performance. 65 This should not be surprising considering the
instrumental benefits sought by employers can often only be achieved
if workplaces actually become both more diverse and also more
inclusive. 66 Targeted recruitment efforts, for instance, increase the
hiring and promotion of women and racial minorities while at the
same time identifying new sources of talent that aid in business
innovation.67 Similarly, programmatic diversity initiatives designed to
foster inclusion, such as mentoring and affinity groups, are credited
with improving work cultures for women and racial minorities while
also driving innovation and enhancing the employer’s reputation for
inclusion with key stakeholders.68
Still critics claim that WDE generate little or no benefit for
women and racial minorities, often pointing to mixed empirical
reviews of diversity to support this claim.69 While it is true there are
64

See infra Part III.A.1.
See Kim et al., supra note 4, at 206 (citing study showing that “‘identityconscious’ human resource practices…are associated with greater gender and racial
diversity in the ranks of management….by closely monitoring personnel
decisions…and by ‘making special efforts to employ and promote the career
progress’ of minorities.”); see also Lisa H. Nishii, The Benefits of Climate for
Inclusion for Gender-Diverse Groups, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1754, 1768 (2013)
(demonstrating that inclusive work climates increase unit-level engagement and
satisfaction by women and reduce turnover); E. H. Buttner et al., Diversity Climate
Impact on Employee of Color Outcomes: Does Justice Matter?, 15 CAREER DEV.
INT’L 239, 249 (2010) (finding that organizational practices facilitating workplace
inclusion correlate with high levels of job satisfaction and low turnover for
employees of color).
66
See generally PAGE, supra note 57 (explaining that diverse workgroups only
generate greater business innovation when the demographic differences among
groups translate into differences of skill and experiences that can be leveraged in
problem-solving); see also Barak, supra note 50, at 87.
67
See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard,
supra note 5, 2479–81 (discussing the Rooney Rule, its impact on the diversity of
the NFL, and how it has been recommended for adoption in the legal profession).
68
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 314; see also Kim et al., supra note 4, at
207–08 (observing that mentoring programs have positive benefits for women and
minorities in management).
69
Lisa L. Broome et al., Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 765–67 (2011) (describing empirical evidence on the
65
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studies purporting to demonstrate negligible benefits accruing to
women and racial minorities from WDE, these studies often have
narrow findings and are contradicted by other data and studies
demonstrating that WDE do generate significant workplace benefits
for women and racial minorities.70 Critics often cite a 2006 study by
Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, and Erin Kelly as proof that WDE
generally have no appreciable benefit for women and racial
minorities. 71 Instead the Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly merely study
concludes that diversity training specifically is not particularly helpful
for improving advancement opportunities for women and minorities.72
However, the study also finds that other WDE, such as mentoring, fair
better in this regard.73 Most important, the study finds that employers
who adopt diversity management structures with accountability for
WDE significantly improve advancement opportunities for women
and racial minorities in the workplace.74 Not only are the beneficial
benefits of diversity as “mixed”); Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the
Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at 1632 (suggesting some diversity efforts
are effective while others are not).
70
See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
71
Tessa L. Dover et al., Diversity Policies Rarely Make Companies Fairer, and They
Feel Threatening to White Men, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/01/diversity-policies-dont-help-women-or-minorities-and-theymake-white-men-feel-threatened (describing the Kalev, Dobbin and Kelly study as
“[a] longitudinal study of over 700 U.S. companies [finding] that implementing
diversity training programs has little positive effect and may even decrease
representation of black women.”).
72
See Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy
of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 590, 594–
95, 611 (2006). Importantly, this study was limited to evaluating only a handful of
diversity practices, including diversity committees/task forces/managers, manager
evaluations, diversity training, networking programs and mentoring programs. Id. at
590. The study was further limited by measuring the efficacy of these programs only
in relation to the increased representation of women and minorities among
management. Id. This finding of the limited utility of diversity training programs is
not surprising considering these programs are not designed to improve advancement
opportunities for women and racial minorities. See id. at 604. Rather, they are
designed to improve work cultures by reducing bias. See id.
73
Id. at 607 (showing mentoring programs have positive effects which are
strengthened by robust accountability structures). Indeed, this study was later
referenced by Kalev & Dobbin as showing only that some of the most popular
corporate diversity programs . . . fail to produce tangible, on-the-ground results.”
Kim et al., supra note 4, at 204.
74
Kalev et al., supra note 72, at 607.
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effects of WDE acknowledged in the Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study
itself, they are also demonstrated in a number of other empirical
studies.75 This research on the beneficial effects of WDE offers strong
proof of their value for improving equal opportunities for women and
racial minorities even when, and perhaps precisely because, they are
justified in instrumental rather than remedial terms.76
II.

THE PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE OF DIVERSITY

Despite the demonstrated improvements in workplace equality
they generate, and the enthusiastic embrace by employers, progressive
legal scholars have frequently criticized WDE. 77 Often failing to
acknowledge their EEO origins, or credit their equality-enhancing
effects, progressive legal scholars have focused instead on the
instrumental justifications for WDE and examples of their potential
harms to assail them as both antithetical in principle and incompatible
in practice with the goal of workplace equality underlying Title VII.78
75

See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 4, at 607; Barak, supra note 50, at 87; Nishii,
supra note 65, at 1763–64; Buttner et al., supra note 65, at 249.
76
See Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at
1632 (suggesting that the instrumental bases for WDEs might actually make them
more effective than equal opportunity efforts undertaken for legal compliance
reasons).
77
See Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 15, at 719 (noting despite widespread adoption
of WDEs, they have “few supporters in the academic and legal community”); but cf.
George H. Taylor, The Object of Diversity, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 653, 657 (2014)
(objecting to Leong’s critique of diversity specifically by positing, “she is mistaken
that there is a disjunction between the basic sense of rightness…and the
implementation of diversity.”). Taylor offers a cogent account of diversity’s
potential to instantiate workplace equality stating, “diversity at its best serves not
only the goal of institutional participation by people of color, but also a recasting,
through this participation, of institutional norms.” Id. at 674.
78
See, e.g. Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 26 (expressing
approval of the diversity rationale only insofar as it aspires to integrative ends, rather
than merely instrumental ends, and further expressing concern that the instrumental
ends might override these integrative ends and thwart the egalitarian purposes of
Title VII); Norton, supra note 19, at 545–47 (acknowledging that despite the turn to
instrumental rationales many questioned whether this “signaled a retreat from
articulating the moral justification for affirmative action….to avoid addressing
directly the barriers of race and class that adversely affect so many [in the
workplace]” and only embracing these rationales to the extent they signal a rejection
of a “racial caste system”); Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work:
“Diversity,” Discrimination and Integration, 59 EMORY L. J. 585, 598 (2010)
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However, this critique ignores the material differences between WDE
and affirmative action that make WDE less likely to be harmful in
practice when properly administered, while at the same time
disregarding the critical alignment between the two that makes them
more compatible in principle than progressives acknowledge. By
identifying these errors in the progressive critique, this Part reveals
that WDE are neither incompatible with the workplace equality goals
underlying Title VII in principle; nor are they necessarily harmful to
the interests of women and racial minorities in practice.79 This part
demonstrates how WDE have the potential, if properly circumscribed,
to aid in the progressive project of advancing workplace equality,
particularly on behalf of women and racial minorities.80
A.

An Overview of the Progressive Critique

The progressive critique of WDE opposes them both in
principle and in practice and can by summarized into the following
objections: (1) WDE’s instrumental rationale(s) are antithetical to the
equality principle underlying Title VII; 81 (2) WDE’s instrumental
rationale(s) are incompatible with the remedial scheme of Title VII;82
(noting that because equality and integration are not dominant themes in the
instrumentalist arguments in favor of WDEs, they are “likely to entrench rather than
destabilize inequality in organizations” especially when used to organize work,
rather than at the moment of entry into the workplace and should be permitted only if
aligned with broader integrative efforts pursuant to Title VII.); Cheryl L. Wade, “We
Are An Equal Opportunity Employer”: Diversity Doublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1541, 1548 (2004) (explaining that WDE discussions often fail to deal with
“difficult problems of discrimination and racism”).
79
See infra Part II.A.
80
See infra Part II.B.
81
For instance, in describing the diversity rationale in the employment context,
Cynthia Estlund described it as “decidedly not a remedial argument; it is
instrumental and forward-looking. It is not about making up for the sins of the past,
but about making a better future.” Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at
216.
82
See Rebecca H. White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of
Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 269 (2004) (arguing that instrumental diversity is in
tension with Title VII’s remedial scheme); see also Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work,
supra note 19, at 218 (suggesting that WDE are only permitted if they incorporate
integrative with instrumental aims); Green, supra note 78, at 621 (urging courts not
to recognize instrumental justification for WDE without alignment with the remedial
purpose of Title VII).
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(3) WDE exploit, rather than benefit, women and racial minorities;83
and (4) WDE essentialize and/or entrench, rather than destabilize or
disrupt, harmful gender and racial stereotypes.84 Following a general
overview of each of these discrete objections, I highlight the ways
progressive legal scholars articulated these objections to WDE in
doctrinal terms in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Grutter v. Bollinger, in which the Court expressly approved of a
university’s interest in student body diversity based in part on the
instrumental benefits that accrue to employers in the form of students
who are “better prepare[d] for an increasingly diverse workforce.”85
Despite judicial endorsement of the instrumental value of diversity in
the educational context, many progressive legal scholars expressed
skepticism that the Court would (or should) similarly embrace this
instrumental diversity interest in the employment context under Title
VII.86
1.

Diversity as Antithetical to Equality

The first, and perhaps most fundamental, objection progressive
scholars have raised in response to the rise of WDE is that these
efforts are simply antithetical to the equality aims of Title VII.87 This
rejection of WDE in principle is based on a belief that the underlying
83

See Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 219 (suggesting that the
“business case for diversity” is problematic in “echo[ing] employers’ discredited
efforts to cite discriminatory ‘customer preferences’ under Title VII.”); see also
Leong, supra note 1, at 2165.
84
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 73 (framing the problem of working
identity in terms of “essentialism”).
85
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. At issue in Grutter was whether the University of
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions plan justified by instrumental
concerns for student body diversity rather than remedial concerns for remedying past
institutional discrimination could withstand challenge under the strict scrutiny
standard applicable to race-based equal protection claims. Id. at 328. The Court
found that achieving the educational benefits of student body diversity was
sufficiently compelling to justify a university’s race-conscious admissions plan. Id.
at 328. This holding was subsequently affirmed in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I),
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
86
See infra Part II.B. This skepticism and hostility towards WDE can be contrasted
with the general embrace of instrumental diversity in the context of higher education
admissions. See e.g. Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 220 (treating
the Grutter diversity interest favorably even while critiquing WDE).
87
See supra note 88–91 and accompanying text; see also Rich, supra note 33, at 2
(describing WDEs as “orthogonal, or even hostile to equality”).
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instrumental rationales make these efforts unsuited to the task of
achieving the social justice goal of workplace equality underlying
Title VII. 88 Illustrating this belief in the fundamental disjunction
between diversity and equality, Skrentny argues that in the turn
towards the instrumental management of WDE, “significant
opportunities and values [have been] lost.” 89 In particular, Skrentny
laments that this shift in emphasis away from a more remedial, nondiscrimination approach and toward instrumental diversity
“sacrifice[s] the consensus goal of equal opportunity” that underlies
the enforcement of Title VII. 90 Stephen Rich similarly argues that
“[p]hilosophically, diversity contradicts basic principles of
antidiscrimination law” because it rejects the remedial rationale for
pursuing equality in favor of an instrumental one.91
This view that WDE are incompatible with, or even
antagonistic to, workplace equality for women and racial minorities
fails to acknowledge WDE’s EEO origins, or the fact that in many
ways WDE have continued to enhance workplace equality and
promote greater workplace inclusion even as they have transcended
these EEO origins. 92 Consequently, WDE and equality are neither
inherently nor necessarily incompatible. 93 Rather the equalityenhancing effects of WDE can be reconciled with the equality
principles underlying Title VII.94

88

Rich, supra note 33, at 2.
SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 2.
90
Id. at 3; see also Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 15, at 721–23 (describing the
“seeming matter-of-fact acceptance of instrumental forms of race” and lamenting
that “the Court has forgotten why race matters, and should matter in certain contexts
and why it does not and should not in others” separating it from historical context).
Frymer and Skrentny do acknowledge that this shift might be a pragmatic response
to the judicial turn away from traditional remedial enforcement of civil rights laws,
but still question the adequacy of instrumental diversity as a substitute for, or even
supplement to, the pursuit of purely egalitarian aims for workplace equality. Id. at
678–79; see also infra Part II.B.
91
Rich, supra note 33, at 2.
92
See infra Part II.B.
93
Id.
94
Id.
89
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Diversity as Incompatible with Title VII

The second objection is a more nuanced version of the first.
Specifically, some progressive scholars point to the expressly remedial
purpose of Title VII to argue that WDE are not only incompatible with
Title VII in principle, but expressly prohibited by it. 95 Skrentny
explains this objection by emphasizing that non-discrimination and
equal opportunity are the only permissible goals justifying race- or
gender-motivated conduct under Title VII. 96 He concludes that the
absence of egalitarian goals as a motivation for engaging in WDE
would prove fatal to their defense under Title VII.97
The problem with this objection is that it conflates the raceand gender-consciousness of WDE with the racial and gender
preferences of remedial affirmative action; but, as explained above,
the two are quite distinct.98 WDE are race- and gender-conscious in
95

See White, supra note 82, at 268 (observing that because Title VII has only been
held to support a remedial interest, the non-remedial diversity interest could not be
sustained under Title VII); Eric A. Tilles, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter
on Affirmative Action in Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451, 462 (2004)
(observing “[u]nder Title VII, an employer may only act to redress past
discrimination or a manifest imbalance in its workforce….Neither of Grutter’s
categories of interest…fit within the Title VII analysis,” notwithstanding a prediction
that Title VII might ultimately be modified to accommodate the diversity interest);
Ciocchetti & Holcomb, supra note 19, at 347 (arguing that the diversity rationale
“butt[s] heads with the express language and anti-discriminatory thrust of Title
VII”); but see Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence
of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1031, 1048–49 (2004); Green, supra note 78, at 617 (arguing that non-remedial
justifications in support of racial/gender preferences were not expressly ruled out by
the Court in Weber); Norton, supra note 19, at 547, 617 (discussing instrumental
diversity efforts and application to an “employment context.” ).
96
SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 80. (“In private employment, where Title VII and
Section 1981 are the relevant statutes, only classical liberalism and affirmative
action liberalism have court backing,” noting there is “no [bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ)] defense for race” under either statute.).
97
Id. at 88; see also Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate
Impact Provision and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling
Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 74, 76–78 (2010) (comparing the instrumental
justifications for race-consciousness under WDE to prohibited customer preferences
under the BFOQ defense).
98
See supra Part II.A.2. It is important to make a distinction between principle and
practice as it relates to WDE. See Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the
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that they acknowledge the instrumental importance of a
demographically diverse workforce and adopt systematic approaches
for achieving workplace diversity, but they need not and ought not
involve racial and gender preferences. 99 Nor do WDE rely on the
explicit consideration of race or gender when making individual
employment decisions.100 This distinction is critical for understanding
why WDE do not necessarily contravene either the purpose or express
language of Title VII notwithstanding their race- or genderconsciousness. 101 Moreover, this distinction is also necessary for
understanding why Title VII law and doctrine can be, and has
generally been, amenable to WDE in spite of their instrumental
aims.102
Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at 1592 (discussing the difference
between WDE in principle and in practice and similarly focusing only on how
WDE are conceived in principle rather than how they operate in practice). WDE
do not always operate in practice the way they are conceived in principle. Id.
Despite this discrepancy, the focus here is on how WDE are conceived in
principle. Id
99
See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard,
supra note 5, at 2476–81 (cautioning that WDE ought not involve explicit
consideration of race or gender in decision making, but may involve other race- and
gender-conscious efforts designed to expand opportunities and create a more
inclusive workplace, such as targeted recruitment or affinity groups).
100
Id. at 2476 (discussing the impropriety of expressly considering race or gender
even as a “tie-breaker” when making employment decisions pursuant to WDE).
101
To understand this difference between the inexplicit race and genderconsciousness of WDE and the explicit racial and gender preferences of affirmative
action plans, it is instructive to review Justice Kennedy’s equal protection
jurisprudence on race distinguishing between permissible race-consciousness and
impermissible racial classifications. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387–95
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that classifying students on the basis of race
must withstand strict scrutiny), with Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. vs. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that race-conscious
efforts to integrate schools might be permissible if they are race-neutral). For an
analysis of Kennedy’s jurisprudence on these and similar cases, see Ciocchetti &
Holcomb, supra note 19, at 342–43. But see Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct.
2198 (2016) (suggesting that even race-conscious efforts may be problematic under
equal protection even when they do not involve racial classifications).
102
See infra Part II.B; see generally Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the
McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra note 5 (surveying decided Title VII diversity
cases to demonstrate the difference in treatment of WDE that are merely race- and
gender-consciousness and affirmative action plans involving racial and gender
preferences).
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Diversity as Exploitive of Women & Racial Minorities

The third objection levied against WDE by progressive
scholars raises a more practical concern. The complaint is that WDE
have the potential to operate in ways that are exploitive of women and
racial minorities who ought instead to be the object of solicitude under
Title VII. 103 Nancy Leong explains this objection in an article
provocatively titled Racial Capitalism. 104 Leong claims that the
instrumental value assigned to racial (and gender) identity by
employers pursuant to WDE results in a commodification of minority
racial (and female gender) identity by predominantly white (male)
institutions.105 Discussing why WDE are exploitive of (women and)
racial minorities and should be viewed warily, Leong describes them
as “merely a useful means . . . to acquire social and economic
benefits” for predominantly white institutions while “avoiding [the]
more difficult questions of racial [and gender] equality.” 106
Exploitation, however, is neither the necessary nor is it an inevitable
consequence of WDE.107 Rather than only generating benefit for the
employer, WDE often generate tangible benefits for employees as
well, including specifically women and racial minorities. 108 These
103

See Leong, supra note 1, at 2155–56, 2194–96 (discussing how diversity and
inclusion efforts commodify nonwhite individuals, and examines racial capitalism in
the workplace); see also Green, supra note 78, at 599 (suggesting that some WDE
“may generate or exacerbate feelings of exploitation and isolation reported by
women and people of color”); Wade, supra note 78, at 1545 (noting that work place
dynamics can lead to situations where “diversity discussions make people of color
supplicants, and whites become their benefactors”); Rich, supra note 33, at 2, 28, 29
(describing WDE as “exploitive”); see also Rebecca K. Lee, Core Diversity, 19
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 477, 492 (2009) (describing the ways in which some
employers implement workplace diversity practices using a “marginal diversity
approach [that] can leave female and minority workers feeling exploited…[and]
further contributes to the stereotyping of women and racial minorities”).
104
Leong, supra note 1, at 2153. Leong’s claim is broader than WDE. Id. at 2153–
56. She assails diversity efforts generally, but she relies heavily on workplace
examples to signify her claims. Id. at 2194–96.
105
Id. at 2155. Leong focuses her critique of WDE on their racial harms, but
acknowledges that these same harms can accrue to other groups targeted by WDE as
well. Id. at 2184, n. 174 (acknowledging the performative harms that similarly
accrue to women and LGBT persons); see also id at 2217 (discussing how work
cultures can impose burdens on the basis of both race and gender).
106
Id.
107
See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
108
Id.
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benefits include, among other things, expanded employment
opportunities and improved work cultures. 109 So this critique skews
the benefit/harm calculus unjustifiably against WDE.110
4.

Diversity Essentializes Racial & Gender Identity

A related fourth objection is that WDE tend to essentialize
and/or entrench gender and racial identities, rather than to disrupt
stereotypic notions of gender and race and allow for more authentic
and inclusive expressions of identity to be valued and flourish in the
workplace.111 Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati unpack this claim as it
relates to race specifically.112 Carbado and Gulati acknowledge that all
employees “feel pressured to signal to their employers that they belong
and possess the right institutional stuff to succeed.” 113 The problem
with WDE, in their estimation, is that racial minorities and women
face greater pressures to work their identities in ways that signal their
belonging to employers than do their white, male peers. 114 The
109

Id.
For an extended discussion of this miscalculation, see Stacy L. Hawkins, Selling
Diversity Short: An Essay Responding to Nancy Leong’s “Racial Capitalism,” 126
HARV. L. REV. __ (2013), 40 RUTGERS L. REC. 68 (2013).
111
See Norton, supra note 19, at 562 (assailing instrumental rationales relating to
businesses “race-matching” employees with customers as “a return to longdiscredited ‘customer preference[s]’…[that] indulges the sort of stereotypes that
antdiscrimination principles seek to counter). For example, Tristin Green discusses
the distinction between race- and sex-based decisions made pursuant to the diversity
rationale at moments of entry, promotion, and exit, which she suggests may improve
overall diversity and equal opportunity for women and racial minorities, and those
made at the level of organizing work (or in assignment of work), which she suggests
are “likely to entrench rather than destabilize inequality in organizations” by
“perpetuat[ing] stereotypes about group difference…lead[ing] to stratification within
workforces as women and minorities become pigeonholed in certain jobs or job
functions and those jobs or functions labeled ‘female’ or ‘minority’ are devalued.”
Green, supra note 78, at 598.
112
Accord CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 23. See also Green, supra note 78,
at 598.
113
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 23. The concern that WDE essentialize
gender and racial identity is most likely to arise when diversity is pursued as a means
of racial signaling, rather than when women and racial minorities are pursued for
their “racial abilities.” See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
114
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 24–35 (explaining that marginalized
groups are may feel the need to do more “identity work” to counteract negative
stereotypes).
110
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concern is that when employers assign value to racial and gender
identity as a part of WDE women and racial minorities are forced to
perform their identities in ways that might be inauthentic and that can
be harmful.115
However, an important distinction identified by Carbado and
Gulati, and one that helps distinguish when WDE may be harmful to
women and racial minorities, and when they may instead actually be
beneficial, is whether the racial signal the institution sends about its
value for workplace diversity requires individuals to “act white” or to
“act [ ] diverse.”116 Carbado and Gulati explain that some institutions
might value individuals who are “diverse in terms of how they look,
but not diverse in terms of how they act.”117 Rebecca Lee calls this
“surface diversity.” 118 Carbado and Gulati also concede that
institutions might instead value individuals who both look and act
“diverse”119 or what Lee would call “core diversity.”120 If employers
value those who both look and act diverse, then applicants and
employees might feel empowered to be more rather than less authentic

115

Id. at 42 (describing identity work as “shadow work…unacknowledged as a
formal matter [and] largely unregulated as a legal matter” with wide reaching
implications). Carbado and Gulati acknowledge that performance can occur along a
number of axes, such as dress, speech, and personal or professional affiliation. See
id. at 1–3. This identify work has many potentially negative implications. See id. at
42.
116
Id. at 21, 116.
117
Id. at 125. Carbado and Gulati further elucidate this desire by explaining that an
institution might very well value diverse individuals for their ability to signal the
openness of the institution, but believe that persons who look different, but act the
same as other institutional “insiders” are likely to generate the most benefit at the
lowest cost to institutional harmony. Id. at 123 (discussing the need for diversity
agents to be likeable outsiders by expressing ideological commitments and social
behaviors that conform to institutional norms). Not all progressive scholars believe
that selecting for intra-racial diversity is harmful to racial minorities, or undesirable
generally. See Vinay Harpilani, Narrowly Tailored But Broadly Compelling:
Defending Race-Conscious Admissions After Fisher, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 761,
817–24 (2015) (discussing the value of universities selecting for intra-racial diversity
as a part of race-conscious admissions).
118
See Lee, Core Diversity, supra note 103, at 489 (describing an expectation that
diverse employees act in identical ways by disregarding difference).
119
CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 136–38.
120
See Lee, Core Diversity, supra note 103, at 494 (describing the “core diversity”
model as leveraging individual differences to improve organizational practices).
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when expressing their identity in the workplace.121 WDE that allow for
these more authentic identity performances are not likely to incur the
kinds of harms that concern progressives. 122 Rather, this value for
“core diversity” would seem to further, not hinder, the workplace
equality goals of Title VII by creating more inclusive work cultures.123
What each of these scholars, including Carbado and Gulati, implicitly
acknowledge is that WDE are not always bad, nor do they necessarily
121

See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 37–38. The reason these demands
might be ameliorated is because the instrumental concern for leveraging workplace
diversity to improve business performance (functional diversity) actually relies on
individual differences associated with persons of different gender, race or ethnicity
without concern for or attention to the ways in which these differences conform to or
conflict with perceptions (stereotypical or otherwise) of group identity. See PAGE
supra note 57, at 305–09; see also Barak, supra note 50, at 87. To the extent that
these instrumental diversity values ameliorate identity performance demands, they
are an advantage over the status quo in which racial and ethnic minorities are
required to do identity performance work as a matter of course. See also Leong,
supra note 1, at 2204–05 (describing the continuous acknowledgement and
negotiation of racial identity by nonwhites irrespective of context). For a discussion
of identity performance demands more generally, see KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING:
THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
122
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 23–25 (acknowledging that all
individuals perform identity work across a range of different contexts). Accordingly,
the mere fact of performing identity work does not incur harm to women and racial
minorities. Id. Instead, only particular types of identity work that are least true to an
individual’s sense of authentic self are the subject of concern. Id. at 35. Nancy Leong
also distinguishes between qualitatively different types of diversity, referring to its
“thin” and “thick” conceptions in the same way that Lee distinguishes between
“surface diversity” and “core diversity.” Leong, supra note 1, at 2169. In diversity
management terms, this is the difference between diversity and inclusion. See
generally Barak, supra note 50.
123
Carbado and Gulati offer Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination for the Supreme
Court by President Obama as an example of this potentially beneficial form of
diversity. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 116–18. They suggest “something
more was at stake vis-à-vis her nomination than to simply have the Court ‘look’
more diverse in its official photographs.” Id. at 117. Without attributing any
particular motive to the nomination, they consider the possibilities that perhaps it
was Justice Sotomayor’s ability to “speak explicitly from her experiences as a
Latina”, or her willingness to “be racially salient when the moment called for it” that
contributed to her nomination. Id. at 117–18. Either of these motivations are
manifestations of WDE that would seem to be beneficial both for individuals, by
alleviating identity performance demands, and for institutions, by both signaling
openness and promoting cultural competence. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text (describing instrumental interests).
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incur the kinds of harms to women and racial minorities for which we
should seek legal redress.124
Accordingly, whether identity performance demands are
harmful or beneficial to racial minorities and women follows from the
way in which diversity is valued and practiced by individual
institutions, not by the adoption of WDE per se.125 If individuals are
valued for their distinctive characteristics, rather than just for their
membership in a particular group, i.e., “core diversity,” this is likely to
inure both to the benefit of the institution and to the individual. 126
Conversely, when institutions value only “surface diversity,”
notwithstanding any institutional value that may accrue from these
efforts, concerns rightly arise about the exploitation of, and harm to,
women and racial minorities from these practices.127
The thrust of both these latter arguments is an objection to the
way WDE operate in practice, rather than an objection to the
instrumental justifications underlying WDE in principle. 128
Accordingly, these objections suggest we might be able to restrain
WDE in practice to accommodate this concern for their potential
harms while also promoting their demonstrated equality-enhancing
124

Cf. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 148 (acknowledging the difficulties of
sorting out the legal claims associated with working identity).
125
Id.
126
See Lee, supra note 118 and accompanying text. The value of promoting
workplace inclusion may even exceed the EEO goals of Title VII because the
emphasis is not merely on improving diversity as measured by the numeric
representation of women and racial minorities in the workplace, but on ensuring the
qualitative experiences of women and racial minorities are improved by fostering
higher levels of engagement from these employees. See Nishii, supra note 65, at
1768; Buttner et al., supra note 65, at 249 (discussing how WDE improve the work
climate for women and racial minorities and foster greater engagement).
127
See Lee, supra note 103, at 490 (noting surface diversity operates to exclude
rather than include difference).
128
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. There is, however, a sense in
which critics of WDE believe that they are equal-opportunity suppressing in practice
precisely because they are believed to be anti-egalitarian in principle. See, e.g.,
Green, supra note 78, at 598 (arguing that WDE are likely to entrench inequality
because they are justified in instrumental rather than egalitarian terms). This
conclusion does not follow if we understand WDE in the context of their equal
opportunity origins, see supra Part II.A.3., and acknowledge their equality
enhancing effects, see supra Part II.B.
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effects.129 Before turning to these prescriptive claims, it is first helpful
to understand how this general critique of WDE translated into a
specific doctrinal critique under Title VII in the wake of Grutter.
B.

The Post-Grutter Doctrinal Critique of Workplace Diversity

The body of scholarship produced by progressive employment
law scholars in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Grutter v. Bollinger also reflected skepticism towards WDE.130 More
than sixty-five corporate amici argued in Grutter that student body
diversity was necessary to succeed in the twenty-first century global
economy, and the Court placed heavy emphasis on this business
rationale when approving of the interest in student body diversity on
behalf of colleges and universities. 131 Not surprisingly then, in the
wake of that decision, legal scholars rushed to predict the likely impact
of the Supreme Court’s embrace of this diversity interest in Grutter on
corporate employers’ ability to justify race- and gender-conscious
action in employment by asserting a comparable diversity interest
under Title VII. 132 Despite the fairly strong endorsement of the
diversity interest to the workplace in Grutter, 133 many of these
scholars seemed to reject the possibility that the Court would fully
embrace the diversity interest when adjudicating it under prevailing
129

See infra Part IV.B.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; see Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra
note 58, at 4. Grutter involved a challenge by a white female applicant denied
admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Id. She alleged that the
School’s race-conscious admissions plan violated the equal protection clause. Id.
However, in upholding the School’s race-conscious admissions plan against
challenge, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the School’s interest in achieving a
diverse student body was sufficiently compelling to justify the use of race in
admissions; and moreover that the flexible, holistic review process employed by the
School was appropriately narrowly tailored as required by the prevailing strict
scrutiny standard applicable to race-based equal protection challenges. Id.
131
Grutter, 539 U.S. 330; see Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note
58, at 10.
132
See infra note 138 (discussing these predictions).
133
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor emphasized
that the instrumental benefits of diversity were “not theoretical but real, as major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, culture, ideas, and viewpoints.” Id.
130
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Title VII doctrine, which they interpreted as permitting only remedial
race-consciousness.134
Cynthia Estlund’s post-Grutter analysis is illustrative of this
critique. 135 Much like Skrentny’s principled objection to WDE,
Estlund’s doctrinal critique expressed deep concern for the tension
between the instrumental rationales articulated in support of WDE and
the remedial, anti-discrimination goals of Title VII.136 She expressed
particular concern that rather than promoting the remedial and
integrative goals of Title VII, WDE instead were a modern echo of
employers’ formerly discredited attempts to cite white customer
preferences as a means of avoiding compliance with the nondiscrimination mandate of Title VII.137 However, perhaps recognizing
the growing embrace of WDE by employers, Estlund suggested that
rather than simply reject these WDE outright, courts should instead
require employers to frame their WDE in both instrumental and
integrative terms to prevent the instrumental aims from overriding the
integrative goals of Title VII. 138 To illustrate her prescriptive claim,
134

Id. See, e.g., Green, supra note 78, at 621; White, supra note 82, at 263–64; Rich,
supra note 33, at 1–2; Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 215–16;
Lillard, supra note 18, at 146; but see Tilles, supra note 95, at 463 (although
acknowledging the discontinuity between the instrumental rationales for diversity in
Grutter and the remedial goals of Title VII, suggest “some basis to believe the
conflict will be resolved by modifying the Title VII analysis to conform to
Grutter.”); Richard N. Appel et al., Affirmative Action in the Workplace: Forty Years
Later, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 549 (2005) (suggesting that non-remedial
diversity rationales may be extended in Title VII context).
135
See Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19; see also Estlund, Putting
Grutter to Work, supra note 60.
136
See Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 217–18. Estlund offered a
more charitable reading of Grutter and its effects on Title VII in a later article in
which she suggested that employers might be able to justify their WDE by
demonstrating that prospective measures of diversity were as suitable as remedial
measures of racial imbalance in deciding whether to permit voluntary affirmative
action. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work, supra note 60, at 6. This suggestion that
employers ought to be permitted to engage in racial or gender preferences as a part
of WDE is problematic, however, because allowing racial or gender preferences for
instrumental reasons raises precisely the concerns for exploitation of women and
racial minorities that Estlund seeks to avoid. See infra Part IV.B.2.
137
Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 219. These concerns are
reflected in the legislative history of Title VII and gave rise to the exclusion of race
as a “bona fide occupational qualification” under the statute.
138
See Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 220. Estlund suggested
that these limits must accommodate claims for individual rights. Id. For a discussion
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Estlund cited the Court’s reasoning in Grutter, recognizing the
instrumental reasons for valuing student body diversity but also
acknowledging the need for special attention to enrolling
underrepresented minority students. 139 By expressly wedding the
diversity interest to remedial concerns in this way, Estlund argued that
Grutter “cured the historical amnesia of the conventional
[instrumental] argument,” and she encouraged the same approach for
WDE.140
Tristin Green similarly argued that courts could not sanction
WDE without undermining the force and effect of Title VII’s
solicitude for protecting women and racial minorities from workplace
discrimination. 141 Green suggested that because integration and
equality are not “dominant themes” of the instrumental rationales for
WDE, these efforts are more likely to “entrench rather than destabilize
[workplace] inequality.” 142 But Green too attempted to blunt this
presumptively negative impact by suggesting, similar to Estlund, that
courts require employers who pursue WDE to also serve the goal of
“reducing present and future workplace discrimination” thereby
“further[ing] Title VII’s broader statutory goals” in addition to
whatever instrumental goals might be furthered by these efforts.143
On the whole this body of literature largely predicted very
limited, if any, application of the instrumental rationales recognized in
Grutter to private employers defending WDE under Title VII unless
the result was expressly to further the remedial, anti-discrimination
goals of Title VII. 144 This principled opposition to WDE, however,
of how Title VII might accommodate the concern for individual claims of
discrimination. See infra Part IV.B.
139
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (acknowledging that a “‘critical mass’ of
underrepresented minorities is necessary to further [the Law School’s] compelling
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”)
140
Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 218, 220. Notably, WDE
already target underrepresented groups. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
141
See Green, supra note 78, at 598.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 620–21. Green concluded that employers should only be permitted to
pursue race- and gender-conscious goals if they are “intended to reduce workplace
discrimination.” Id. at 614.
144
See supra note 138. These predictions did exhibit nuance, despite their caution.
For example, Eric Tilles suggested that courts might try to resolve the inherent
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was tempered by some pragmatism that these efforts might be
tolerable if there could be some forced alignment with the egalitarian
objectives of Title VII.145 This proposed prescription, like the related
critique, fails to recognize the existing alignment between WDE and
the egalitarian objectives of Title VII. 146 Despite their instrumental
goals, WDE remain allied with their EEO origins insofar as they
continue to have equality-enhancing effects by improving equal
opportunities for women and racial minorities and fostering inclusive
work cultures. 147 The challenge for progressives is not to create
alignment between WDE and workplace equality, or force this
alignment to be more explicit.148 The challenge instead ought to be for
Title VII law and doctrine to be developed and interpreted in ways that
conflict between the remedial scheme of Title VII and the instrumental diversity
interest by “modifying the Title VII analysis to conform to Grutter.” Tilles, supra
note 95, at 463. Cynthia Estlund, on the other hand, argued that the impact of
Grutter would be more limited in the employment context, amounting to no more
than a different means of demonstrating a manifest imbalance in the workforce by
importing the “critical mass” concept from Grutter into the Title VII proof scheme
for voluntary affirmative action under Weber and Johnson. See generally Estlund,
Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19 (treating Grutter diversity interest favorably
even while critiquing WDE). Notably, this skepticism and hostility towards WDE
can be contrasted with progressives’ general approval of the Court’s embrace of
instrumental diversity in the context of higher education admissions. Id. (citing to
Grutter approvingly).
145
See, e.g., SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 268–69. Skrentny, for instance, goes to
great lengths to reconcile what he believes is the irreversible trend towards WDE
with what he believes to be the fundamental goal of Title VII—achieving workplace
equality on behalf of women and racial minorities. Id. at 268–69. Skrentny dedicates
an entire chapter of his book to sorting out the possible legal consequences of the
turn towards WDE, and attempts to reconcile them to the egalitarian purposes
underlying Title VII. Id. at 265–90. See also Turner, supra note 18, at 233–34
(suggesting the diversity rationale might be available, if at all, to public employers,
but suggesting that the instrumentalist goals that accompany the diversity rationale
necessitate “higher scrutiny” to ensure they do not offend the “fundamental
antidiscrimination and integrationist” ideals that Title VII embodies.); Green, supra
note 78 (advocating for acceptance of diversity only if properly aligned with the
integrative goals of Title VII); Wade, supra note 78 (suggesting that in order for
diversity to promote the interests of women and minorities it workplace equality, it
must be coupled with a compliance-oriented perspective that seeks to reduce
discrimination); Rich, supra note 33 (suggesting that diversity efforts be combined
with institutional practices designed to support the advancement of underrepresented
persons as envisioned by Title VII).
146
See supra Part II.A.3.
147
See supra notes 65–67.
148
See infra Part III.B.
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promote the existing equality-enhancing effects of WDE and limit
their possibility for engendering the kinds of harms identified by
progressive scholars.149
Notably, pragmatism may have prevailed over principle in
shaping the doctrinal prescriptions proposed by progressive scholars in
part because the more favored remedial and integrative approaches to
Title VII enforcement have become increasingly ineffective in
preventing and correcting workplace discrimination against women
and racial minorities, let alone in promoting workplace equality. 150
Although progressive scholars have decried this judicial turn away
from more robust remedial enforcement of Title VII, 151 it likely
149

See infra Part III.B. This prescription is not the same as the progressive
prescription that employers be forced to justify WDE in remedial or integrationist
terms or to structure these efforts with an eye towards remedial or integrationist
aims. Rather, the suggestion here is that Title VII law and doctrine be developed in
ways that acknowledge and approve of WDE insofar as they demonstrate continued
compatibility with the workplace equality goals of Title VII and otherwise restrict or
proscribe their operation when their effects serve to undermine the goal of workplace
equality. For a fuller discussion of this prescription, see infra Part IV.B and cites
therein.
150
See Sullivan, supra note 95, at 1085–87 (recognizing a “retrenchment” by the
Supreme Court in Title VII cases that reflects a view of discrimination as “rare”
rather than commonplace and observing “[r]acial discrimination, and to a lesser
extent sex discrimination, has become so anathematized in our society that it is
increasingly hard for juries (even judges) to believe it occurs.”); Natasha Martin,
Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 318 (2010) (discussing the many ways that
Title VII standards have been ratcheted up to make it more difficult for
discrimination plaintiffs to succeed); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court
Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1160, 1163
(2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s narrowing construction of Title VII has
limited its ability to accomplish the original goal of securing workplace equality on
behalf of women and minorities); Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations
Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J.
SOC. No. 3, 888–954 (2011) [hereinafter Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule]
(applying sociological neoinsitutional theory to demonstrate that prevailing Title VII
legal standards do not adequately police institutional actors for discriminatory
conduct, but simply defer to employers who demonstrate structural compliance with
EEO laws).
151
See Martin, supra note 150, at 318 (discussing how pretext standard has operated
to foreclose relief for Title VII plaintiffs); Chambers, supra note 150, at 1162
(discussing how expanded deference to employers has operated to limit remedies for
Title VII plaintiffs); see also Sullivan, supra note 95, at 1085–87 (observing
“retrenchment by the Supreme Court in Title VII cases reflects a change in the ‘basic
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explains why, despite some misgivings, many progressive scholars
have often not rejected WDE outright but instead have offered
qualified support for these efforts.152
C.

Diversity & Equality: An Unlikely Alliance

This turn away from robust enforcement of traditional civil
rights remedies is not unique to Title VII, but indicative of a broader
judicial trend.153 The receding tide of civil rights enforcement, while
lamentable, actually offers progressive scholars the chance to reenvision equal opportunity law and doctrine by finding unlikely allies
(employers) and deploying unlikely tools (WDE) in the fight for
workplace equality.154 From this perspective, WDE might be viewed
as beneficial, rather than detrimental, to the cause of workplace
equality.155 As traditional civil rights remedies have narrowed, WDE

assumption’ underlying McDonnell Douglas: discrimination…is now viewed as rare
…courts [are] more likely to believe cronyism…[or] personal animus explains
disadvantages for minorities. These alternate explanations are increasingly replacing
a presumption of discrimination in the courts.”).
152
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
153
The most recent evidence of this trend in the employment context is Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (rejecting an employer’s race-conscious efforts to
avoid a disparate impact in the promotion of firefighters by holding than an
employer must demonstrate a “strong basis in evidence” that the disparate impact
will result in legal liability before engaging in a race-conscious remedy to cure the
disparity). This trend can be seen in other legal domains as well, including
education. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007) (striking down race-conscious student assignments in primary and
secondary schools) and voting rights, see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013) (striking down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
154
This opportunity, and the unlikely alliance with corporate employers, has been
acknowledged by at least some progressive scholars. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 103;
Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule, supra note 150; Wade, supra note 78; see
also Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra
note 5 (arguing that WDEs may, ironically, redeem Title VII as a bulwark for the
protection of women and racial minorities).
155
Even the EEOC has acknowledged this potential. See Press Release, EEOC, Race
and National Origin Discrimination Persist 50 Years After EEOC’s Founding (April
15, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-15-15.cfm (experts
recommend focus on diversity and inclusion efforts as a way to reduce workplace
discrimination and continuing inequalities).
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have opened up space for alternate practices and accompanying
doctrines of anti-discrimination law to emerge.156
In some ways WDE have created a dilemma for progressive
scholars who tend to view them as antithetical to the principles they
believe best effectuate workplace equality, such as the remedial
principle underlying Title VII.157 At the same time, these scholars also
recognize that narrowing judicial redress for traditional workplace
discrimination under Title VII leaves much of the inequality
experienced by women and racial minorities in the modern workplace
unredressed.158 This is a false dilemma.159
Progressive scholars need not betray the commitment to
equality, or even abandon the remedial principles underlying Title VII,
to embrace WDE and their potential for creating more inclusive and
equitable workplaces for women and racial minorities. 160 WDE are
neither inherently nor inevitably antithetical to the principles of
equality underlying Title VII.161 Rather, they have the potential to be
equality-enhancing, despite their expressly instrumental aims. 162
Notwithstanding the progressive scholarly critiques that followed in
156

Cf. id. By comparison, the literature exploring these alternate theories of equality
under equal protection doctrine is wide-ranging; see Reva Siegel, From
Colorblindness to Anti-Balkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278, 1282 (2011) (positing that one way to
understand the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence is as a mechanism for
avoiding racial balkanization among groups and simultaneously, facilitating social
cohesion among groups); see generally William Eskridge, A Pluralist Theory of the
Equal Protection Clause, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1239 (2009) (envisioning the
protection of minority rights as a function of a pluralist political system of
governance that safeguards fully participating social minority groups from class
legislation harmful to their collective interests). See generally Kenji Yoshino, The
New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (suggesting that a libertybased theory of substantive due process rights supplant equality-based theories of
rights on behalf of minority groups).
157
See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
158
Id.
159
See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
160
See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, 268-269 (discussing the diversity rationale as
complementary to the traditional, remedial rationales).
161
See supra Part II.B.
162
Id.
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the wake of Grutter, WDE deserve renewed and refocused
consideration to assess their potential for advancing workplace
equality on behalf of women and racial minorities.163
In deciding whether to embrace or reject WDE, progressive
legal scholars ought to weigh several considerations. First,
progressives must decide whether, on balance, WDE serve or disserve
the goal of workplace equality in practice, rather than focusing only on
how they are justified in principle. In adjudging the efficacy of school
districts’ efforts to desegregate elementary schools in the wake of
Brown v. Bd. of Education, the Supreme Court famously remarked that
the best plan was one that “promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now.”164 Similarly, WDE should not be
judged solely by their instrumental rationales, but by whether they
“promise realistically to work” in advancing workplace equality on
behalf of those women and racial minorities who continue to suffer

163

This is not to say that support for WDEs should supplant diligent enforcement of
Title VII through the prosecution of traditional claims of discrimination on behalf of
women and racial minorities or voluntary affirmative action by employers, where
such actions can be justified and defended under prevailing legal standards. See
Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra n. 5
at 2465. Increasingly, however, these efforts are difficult to defend and employers
should be mindful of the ratcheting up of the legal standards applicable to voluntary
affirmative action efforts. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (requiring
that employers demonstrate not only a manifest imbalance in the workplace as a
predicate for voluntary affirmative action, but also a strong basis in evidence that the
employer would be subject to liability for disparate impact discrimination). Nor is
the claim that support for WDE should be uncritical. The suggestion is instead that
WDE might offer some incremental benefit in achieving the goal of workplace
equality on behalf of women and racial minorities, beyond that accomplished by
remedial enforcement of Title VII alone, particularly as these remedial efforts
decline in scope and significance. This is not the same argument made by Estlund
and others that courts should sanction WDE only when they are aligned with
remedial and integrationist goals. See supra notes 65–67. Rather, the claim here is
that in addition to pursuing remedial enforcement of Title VII through traditional
discrimination claims prosecuted by and on behalf of women and racial minorities,
or even the adoption of voluntary affirmative action plans, we ought to consider how
employer-adopted WDE might complement these Title VII enforcement efforts
given the collateral benefits that often accrue to women and racial minorities from
these programs. See supra Part II.A.3.
164
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
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from discrimination and exclusion in the workplace.165 The evidence
suggests WDE have the potential to be equality-enhancing not just in
spite of but perhaps because of their expressly instrumental aims.166
Second, consideration must be given to the shifting trajectory
of anti-discrimination law, and Title VII doctrine in particular. 167 If
there are ways to leverage this doctrinal shift, those strategies ought to
be fully deployed in service of the equality goals underlying Title
VII. 168 Derrick Bell’s often-cited interest convergence theory posits
that equality for underrepresented minority groups may be possible
only when the interests of these groups are aligned with the interests of
the majority. 169 In many ways interest convergence theory explains
why embracing WDE might offer the best hope for advancing
workplace equality for women and racial minorities.170
III.

DIVERSITY & EQUALITY: POSSIBILITIES AND NEW PREDICTIONS

In order to understand how best to leverage Title VII law and
doctrine to ensure that WDE continue to advance workplace equality
consistent with their EEO origins, even as they also realize
instrumental goals, it is necessary to first understand how Title VII law
has responded to WDE to date. Although the Supreme Court has yet to

165

See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text; see infra note 211 (discussing the
ways Title VII fails to prevent/correct many forms of discrimination).
166
See supra notes 65 and 76 and accompanying text.
167
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
168
The EEOC took a similarly pragmatic approach in its recently released report on
harassment in the workplace, in which the authors note that while harassment is both
legally and morally wrong, and ought to be redressed by employers for those reasons
alone, “employers should also care about stopping harassment because it makes
good business sense.” CHAI FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, SELECT TASK
FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 17 (2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf.
169
See Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and The Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
170
See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 77, at 659 (describing diversity efforts generally as
“a prototypical example of Bell’s theory of ‘interest convergence’” and even noting
that Bell himself acknowledged that diversity efforts “fit his interest convergence
theory.”); see also Lee, supra note 103, at 506 (acknowledging that employers may
be more motivated to pursue practices that align with their business interests).
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decide a case involving WDE, many lower federal courts have. 171
Overwhelmingly, these courts have approved of WDE when they are
merely race- and gender-conscious; in contrast they have increasingly
disapproved of the types of racial and gender preferences,
characteristic of remedial affirmative action.172
Noted legal scholar Lauren Edelman has written extensively
about how managerial practices, such as WDE, have influenced the
development of Title VII law and doctrine.173 Edelman, writing with
several colleagues, has identified two theories that explain the
influence of management’s embrace of WDE on the development of
Title VII law and doctrine.
A.

A Theory of Law & Workplace Diversity

Edelman developed the first theory − “managerialization of
law” − by studying WDE specifically.174 This theory posits that when
business managers translate legal rules into business practice, they get
filtered in a way that reorients them away from an emphasis on legal
compliance and towards an emphasis on managerial concerns such as
maximizing productivity and profitability.175 This theory describes the
evolutionary account of WDE precisely, having begun as rebranded
EEO compliance efforts, then expanded and ultimately transcended
171

For a quantitative and qualitative analysis of these cases, see generally Hawkins,
How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra note 5, 2467–
73.
172
See id. at 2468–69. In a survey of post-Grutter cases, employers defending
workplaces diversity programs involving race- and gender- conscious efforts that did
not involve explicit racial or gender preferences experienced an eighty-six percent
success rate. Id. at 2468. By contrast, employers defending voluntary affirmative
action plans involving explicit racial and/or gender preferences succeeded only
fifteen percent of the time. Id. at 2468–69.
173
See generally Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra
note 59; Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule, supra note 150.
174
Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at
1597–99.
175
Id. at 1599. These motivations are consistent with the instrumental justifications
offered in support of WDEs. See id. at 1619. Coding references to WDEs that
appeared in the management literature beginning in the late 1980’s, Edelman et al.
found that “profit” was the most frequently cited reason in support of WDE, and also
found references to managerial concerns for demographic diversity, legal
compliance, fairness and responsiveness to customers. Id.
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these origins to become the instrumental efforts we see today focused
largely, if not exclusively, on business performance goals. 176 What
Edelman’s theory suggests is that, through the process of “normative
isomorphism,” this managerial conception of EEO law got conveyed
back into the legal domain where it has been incorporated into the
law. 177 Consequently, EEO law has become “managerialized” or
“infused” with the managerial value for instrumental diversity as an
acceptable means of achieving EEO compliance.178 Importantly, at the
same time that law becomes managerialized, businesses also become
more “legalized” by these new legal norms shaped by and responsive
to their managerial concerns. 179 Although Edelman, like many other
progressive legal scholars, cautions about the dangers of this shift that
WDE have occasioned away from a more remedial EEO compliance
orientation, she nevertheless acknowledges the transformative
potential of WDE for both Title VII law and employment practice,
particularly in light of the waning remedial enforcement of Title
VII.180
176

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at
1595–96. The authors explain this process of “normative isomorphism” as consistent
with “institutional theory,” which “posits that the professions are key carriers of
ideas among and across organizational fields and that the personnel, managerial, and
legal professions are particularly important carriers of ideas about law” making them
a “source of normative isomorphism within and across [each of these] organizational
fields.” Id. Specifically, they found that the management rhetoric accompanying and
justifying the adoption of WDE had a particularly strong influence on the
construction of Title VII law because the management rhetoric emphasizing the
“novelty” of these practices allowed the logic of instrumental diversity to challenge
the increasingly contested meaning of EEO law. Id. at 1610–11, 1631 (describing the
decline in EEO enforcement during the Reagan Administration and the ensuing
public/political backlash against affirmative action). The result was the development
of legal standards that gradually embraced instrumental diversity’s expanded
conception of who ought to be protected against workplace discrimination under
Title VII, as well as a shift in emphasis away from remediation and towards
organizational effectiveness. Id. at 1602.
178
Id. This can be seen in the Court’s embrace of this managerial value for
instrumental diversity in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 220, as well as in the EEOC’s embrace
of WDEs. EEOC, supra note 22, at 150, 162.
179
See Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at
1602.
180
Id. at 1632. According to Edelman et al., the cost of this shift is that it “divests
law of its moral component.” Id. The benefit, however, is that because “civil rights
177
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Applying this managerialization of law theory to judicial
decision-making in Title VII cases, Edelman and her colleagues
identified a related phenomenon at the intersection of law and
management practice – the “legal endogeneity” of organizations – that
builds on managerialization of law. 181 Edelman and her colleagues
demonstrated that whatever resulting compliance practices employers
adopt in response to the new managerialized version of EEO law,
“legal actors and legal institutions become increasingly likely to
associate those practices with legal compliance.”182 Legal endogenity
can be broken down into three, progressive stages: reference,
relevance, and deference. 183 Reference indicates that “organizational
structures have entered the judicial lexicon”. 184 Relevance occurs
when judges consider these managerial practices in the determination
of legal compliance.185 Finally, at the deference stage, judges are more
likely than not to presume the legal adequacy of these managerial
practices to accomplish the intended compliance goal without
scrutinizing their actual effects.186
Edelman, et al. tested this theory of legal endogeneity by
studying judicial review of employers’ discrimination and harassment
policies and procedures in cases alleging workplace discrimination and
harassment.187 They found that, despite the lack of empirical proof of
the beneficial effects of these policies and procedures for preventing or
correcting discrimination and/or harassment as intended (and in some
law…never provided a panacea for women, minorities and other disenfranchised
groups, …[diversity] may overcome much of the managerial resistance to
nontraditional workers by transforming the notion of ‘difference’ from one of legal
imposition to one of business advantage.” Id. at 1632–33.
181
Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule, supra note 150, at 890.
182
Id. Similar to the managerialization of law, Edelman et al. found the context is
ripened for legal endogeneity when there is ambiguity or political contest
surrounding the law, as there was concerning EEO enforcement during the rise of
WDE. Id. at 891.
183
Id. at 893–94.
184
Id. at 894.
185
Id.
186
Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule, supra note 150, at 894.
187
Id. at 898–900.The policies and procedures studied by Edelman and her
colleagues included anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies, as well as the
attendant training and complaint procedures. Id.
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cases proof of their harm), the more commonplace these policies and
procedures became the more likely judges were to cite to them as a
material consideration in adjudging Title VII liability (i.e., the greater
their reference and relevance), and also the more likely these policies
and procedures were to “acquire an aura of legitimacy irrespective of
their impact,” (i.e., the greater their deference).188 Once presumptively
legitimate, Edelman and her colleagues found that judges were less
likely to scrutinize these policies and procedures for their practical
effect in achieving Title VII compliance, and were instead more likely
to simply reference their very existence as evidence of an employer’s
Title VII compliance, or as evidence rebutting an employee’s claim of
discrimination or harassment. 189 Again, Edelman, et al. caution that
legal endogeneity undermines robust Title VII enforcement, but they
also acknowledge that this effect is not inevitable if legal actors
closely scrutinize managerial practices for their efficacy in promoting
the workplace equality goals underlying Title VII.190
Based on these findings, it is not surprising that as WDE have
proliferated, they have become managerialized in law. 191 More
important, as they have expanded both their reference 192 and
relevance,193 they have become increasingly likely to receive judicial
deference.194 This insight is helpful for understanding why, contrary to
188

Id. at 898–900.
Id. at 902.
190
Id. at 933, 935.
191
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
192
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308. Reference to diversity in legal opinions was
relatively limited prior to its proliferation in corporate America and its judicial
embrace in Grutter. See id.
193
Id. at 330. The judicial embrace of the diversity interest in Grutter, as well as the
Court’s citation in Grutter to the corporate amicus briefs in support of the claimed
benefits of diversity as “not theoretical, but real,” demonstrate the increasing
relevance of these diversity efforts. Id.
194
See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard,
supra note 5, at 2477 (discussing cases adjudicating WDE in which courts have
taken judicial notice of the beneficial value of diversity and its relevance to the
modern workplace as well as presumed that an employer’s commitment to diversity
could not be proof of discriminatory intent); see, e.g., Brown v. Delaware River Port
Auth., 10 F. Supp. 3d 556, 566 (D. N.J. 2014) (rejecting a memorandum instructing
a hiring manager to change a position description after the initial posting failed to
yield a diverse applicant pool as evidence of pretext for discrimination, reasoning “if
189
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the post-Grutter predictions of many progressive scholars, courts have
already demonstrated a willingness to embrace WDE as consonant
with rather than antagonistic to Title VII.195
This presumption of legitimacy accorded to WDE by judges is not
problematic per se. Yet Edelman, et al. caution courts and other legal
actors against abdicating their responsibility to ensure adequate
enforcement of Title VII in the face of these increasing managerial
pressures. 196 The theories of managerialization of law and legal
endogeneity reveal the potential for Title VII law and doctrine to
police the boundaries between those WDE that are equality-enhancing
and those that are, or have the potential to be, equality-suppressing.197
By permitting the former and proscribing or otherwise signaling
disapproval of the latter, Title VII law can help maximize the equalityenhancing potential of WDE while minimizing their potential harm.198
Notably, the managerialization of WDE into EEO law demonstrates
that attempts to reject WDE in principle are unlikely to succeed. 199
Instead, progressive ought to focus on how best to structure Title VII
law and doctrine to prevent WDE from realizing any potential harms
to the greatest extent possible.200
it is literally true then it proves the opposite of discriminatory intent since the stated
reason for the change was to increase diversity in the applicant pool…”); Bissett v.
Beau Rivage Resorts, 442 F. App’x 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that a diversity
policy did not support an inference of discrimination where the policy stated that the
employer “values diversity and considers it an important and necessary tool that will
enable [the employer] to maintain a competitive edge,” and that the employer “is
committed to maintaining a workforce that reflects the diversity of the community”).
195
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
196
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
197
See infra Parts III.A.1–2.
198
Title VII has not only enforcement value, but also expressive value. Cf. Katie R.
Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 527, 569 (2014) (discussing the expressive value of civil rights laws
targeting anti-gay discrimination). As EEO compliance enforcement legalizes
employers, they should internalize both the enforcement and expressive values
embodied in these legal rules. For an example of how employers have already
internalized EEO compliance in the area of sexual harassment enforcement, see infra
note 280.
199 See supra n. 194 (discussing cases in which courts have taken judicial notice of
the beneficial value of WDE).
200
Several other progressive scholars have similarly urged the adoption of
appropriate limits under Title VII to cabin the harmful effects that can accrue to
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Leveraging Diversity to Advance Workplace Equality

The first equality-suppressing concern reflected in the
literature critiquing WDE is that these efforts can sometimes operate
to exploit women and racial minorities.201 The second concern is that
“surface” WDE might have the effect of essentializing racial and
gender identity and therefore reinforcing instead of disrupting harmful
stereotypes. 202 There are two interventions in Title VII law and
doctrine that would allow courts to better scrutinize WDE for the
harms that may accrue to women and racial/ethnic minorities when
WDE go awry in practice.203 The first intervention is directed towards
the harm of essentializing racial and gender identity, and the second is
directed toward the harm of exploitation.204
1.

Disparate Impact Liability for “Surface Diversity”

When employers value women and racial minorities for the
signal they send to internal or external audiences about the
organizational commitment to diversity, the employer may essentialize
race and gender in ways that can be harmful to these employees.205
Notably, these harms are most likely to occur if the employer
expresses a value only for “surface diversity,” rather than a value for
“core diversity.” 206 For instance, where employers value “surface
diversity” employees may feel compelled (or worse yet be obligated)
to perform “identity work” for the benefit of their employer and to
women and racial minorities from WDE. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 33, at 47; Wade,
supra note 78, at 1575. Whereas these scholars largely focus on redirecting the
underlying rationale of WDE towards remediation and integration, and away from
instrumental business concerns, the prescriptions offered here focus instead on
policing the effects of WDE regardless of their underlying rationale. Additionally,
some of these scholars have suggested that racial and gender preferences might be
permissible in the interest of instrumental diversity. See supra notes 65–67. For the
reasons discussed, see infra Part IV.B.2., the prescriptions offered here would
proscribe the use of racial and gender preferences as a part of WDE.
201
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
202
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
203
See infra Part III.A.1–2.
204
Id.
205
See SKRENTNY supra note 2, at 11, for an in-depth discussion of racial signaling.
206
See supra notes 120 and 122 and accompanying text (describing “surface” and
“core” diversity).
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their own detriment.207 The harms that can accrue to women and racial
minorities from these identity performance demands are largely
expressive and dignitary, but they can also be more tangible and in
some instances may even be pecuniary. 208 The question is how to
interpret Title VII law and develop Title VII doctrine in these cases to
promote WDE when they are beneficial (or at least not harmful) to
women and racial minorities, i.e., core diversity, and to proscribe (or
otherwise discourage) those WDE that are harmful regardless of any
instrumental benefit that might accrue to the employer, i.e., surface
diversity?209
Scholars have observed that even when WDE incur harm by
imposing identity performance demands on women and racial
minorities, individually these harms may be difficult to remedy under
Title VII’s prevailing McDonnell Douglas standard applicable to
207

See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 24. Common forms of this “identity
work” include but are not necessarily limited to: appearing in marketing materials,
attending diversity events, and race- and gender- matched mentoring. See Leong,
supra note 1, at 2153 (describing a particularly egregious incident where a person of
color was photo-shopped into a marketing brochure). Carbado and Gulati define this
identity work more expansively as anything that a woman and/or racial minority
employee might feel compelled to do to either negate perceptions (often
stereotypical) of her as an outsider or to promote perceptions of her as an insider. See
CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 24.
208
Title VII’s requirement that plaintiffs prove a tangible adverse employment action
forecloses the possibility of redress for harms that are only dignitary or expressive in
nature. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing plaintiff’s burden of proof at the prima facie case
stage of the analysis to demonstrate some tangible, adverse employment action
suffered because of that person’s race, ethnicity, gender, or another protected basis).
Carbado and Gulati quantify the pecuniary harms that can accrue to women and
racial minorities from working their identities for the benefit of their employer to
include both lost or diminished career opportunities and lost or reduced
compensation. See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3. For a discussion of the
burdens placed on racial minorities from both voluntary and involuntary mentoring,
see Audrey Williams June, The Invisible Labor of Minority Professors, THE CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 8, 2015).
209
See infra notes 210–220 and accompanying text. There are two ways that Title
VII law and doctrine can prevent employers from adopting harmful WDE: First, the
expressive value of Title VII signals opprobrium of this conduct, thus discouraging it
in the first instance; and Second, as Edelman and her colleagues demonstrated, legal
endogeneity operates by influencing the widespread adoption of certain management
structures rather than others. See supra notes 196 and 190 and accompanying text.
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claims of disparate treatment discrimination. 210 Problems of proof
might arise at various stages of the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework,211 including when the plaintiff is called upon to
offer evidence at the prima facie case stage that an adverse action is
suffered or that such action is based on the plaintiff’s race or
gender.212 Similarly, at the final stage of proof it may be difficult to
convince a trier-of-fact that unlawful discrimination, rather than other
concerns, motivated the employer’s actions. 213 These challenges
would not be easy to overcome. 214 However, women and racial
minorities forced to perform this kind of “identity work” to their
210

See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 66 (acknowledging that the harms of
WDE generally may not be “a problem anti-discrimination law can fix.”). Scholars
have offered other, novel ways to compensate for these burdens, such as by adjusting
salary accordingly, reducing other work obligations proportionately, see June, supra
note 208, or providing additional value to women and racial minorities in exchange
for this work. See Eli Wald, BigLaw Identity Capital: Pink & Blue, Black & White,
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2509, 2514 (2015).
211
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework requires the plaintiff to first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by offering proof that: (1) he/she is in a
protected class, (2) he/she was qualified for the position sought (in the case of hire or
promotion) or met the employer’s legitimate expectations (in the case of
termination), and (3) similarly situated employees were treated differently or the
adverse action was taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802. Assuming the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. This is a burden of production,
not one of proof. See id. If the defendant satisfies the burden of production at the
second stage, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who at the third stage must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated by the
defendant is pretextual and/or that the real reason for the adverse action was
unlawful discrimination. Id. at 804–05.
212
See supra note 211 (detailing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
generally and the prima facie case burden specifically).
213
For instance, Carbado and Gulati concede that identity performance is a routine
fact of life, and often individuals choose to perform their identities in certain ways
without any explicit institutional prompting. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at
15. The absence of any act on the part of the employer to demand identity
performance, or to demand specific types of identity performance, by racial
minorities or women might prove fatal to a Title VII plaintiff’s burden under the
McDonnell Douglas proof scheme. See supra note 211 and accompanying text
(discussing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework).
214
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 65 (noting that the problems of
diversity are not about “animus” and therefore are unlikely to be subject to legal
sanction under existing standards).
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detriment may not be without remedy if they are able to effectively
assert a claim for relief under a disparate impact theory of liability.215
Rather than proving individual harm and intentional discrimination
pursuant to a disparate treatment theory of liability under the
McDonnell Douglas standard, under a disparate impact theory of
liability, aggrieved employees need only establish that: (1) the
employer’s WDE incur the burdens of identity performance; (2) these
burdens are born disparately by women and/or racial minorities;216 and
(3) such efforts are not “job related” and “consistent with business
necessity.”217 Pursuing a disparate impact theory of liability might be
preferable for two reasons. 218 First, it avoids the problems of proof
associated with a disparate treatment theory of liability.219 Second, and
perhaps more important, it allows courts to make individualized
decisions about the effects of WDE in the context of particular
institutional practices, rather than suggesting that WDE are
presumptively discriminatory. 220 An example loosely extrapolated
from the literature is instructive.
215

In addition to proscribing individual acts of discrimination, under certain
circumstances, Title VII also prohibits employers from engaging in any conduct that
has an adverse impact on a protected class. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
216
Carbado and Gulati assert as a relatively indisputable proposition that Black
employees, for example, could establish that they perform more identity work than
others due to the negative stereotypes attributed to them in the workplace, such as
laziness and the lack of qualifications, and the need to negate these stereotypes in
order to enjoy professional success and/or career advancement. See CARBADO &
GULIATI, supra note 3, at 35–36. If this assumption is true, minority plaintiffs are
likely to be able to meet the burden of proof on a disparate impact claim; see also
Leong, supra note 1, at 2207–08 (offering the kind of evidence that might be
available to demonstrate the disparate burdens placed on racial minority employees
to work their identity in contexts where their employer instrumentally values
workplace diversity); see also id. at 2202 (positing that historic racial inequities
necessarily render a disparate impact in the identity performance demands imposed
on racial and ethnic minorities versus white employees and suggests this is a matter
about which anti-discrimination law should be concerned and which it “plausibly
proscribe[s]”).
217
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
218
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 74–76 (discussing these claims under a
disparate treatment theory of discrimination).
219
Id. at 65 (observing proof problems under a disparate impact theory).
220
Disparate impact liability tends to have less of a chilling effect on employment
practices than does disparate treatment liability. Compare, for example, the
difference between the chilling effect that Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1986), had in proscribing diversity considerations in teacher layoffs and the

Hawkins

2016]

LONG ARC OF DIVERSITY

105

Imagine that an elite corporate law firm is hiring entry-level
associates from among a diverse pool of applicants.221 This firm has
expressed a commitment to the instrumental benefits of diversity and
has avowed to increase their hiring of diverse entry-level associates.222
The hiring committee decides that in addition to evaluating the
candidates’ academic credentials, the firm will also consider the extent
to which each candidate would be a good “fit”223 and/or contribute to
the firm’s diversity. 224 Assume that on the basis of the information
available to the hiring committee from the resumes and interviews of
the candidates, the selection decisions are as follows: [see table on
following page].

negligible effect on pre-employment testing generally of the finding of
discriminatory impact in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
221
This example manipulates the hypothetical offered in the original text to highlight
the potential Title VII claims relating to identity performance. CARBADO & GULATI,
supra note 3, at 72–76. Carbado and Gulati actually offer two different
hypotheticals, one involving the non-selection of a Black woman among a group of
racially and gender-diverse candidates and another involving the non-selection of a
single Black woman among a group of Black women. Id.
222
See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard,
supra note 5 (discussing law firms’ avowed commitment to diversity, including
specifically hiring diverse associates).
223
“Fit” is the subject of much scholarly debate insofar as it may serve as a barrier to
employment and/or advancement for women and minorities or even as a proxy for
discrimination. See, e.g., CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 137–39.
224
Id. If the candidates were not equally well-qualified based on their credentials, it
might be more difficult to justify the consideration of diversity in selecting among
these applicants. See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas
Standard, supra note 5 (discussing the legal risks associated with various law firm
diversity efforts and in particular noting the low risk of liability under the
McDonnell Douglas standard associated with subjective diversity hiring when
candidates have equivalent credentials). According to Carbado and Gulati these are
the precise circumstances in which institutions make intra-racial and intra-gender
decisions that implicate individual’s working identity and that are likely to impose
identity performance demands on individuals. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3.
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Name225

Demographic

Elizabeth
Peters

White Female

Rebecca
Simon

White Female

William
Reynolds
Lydia
Cruz

White Male

Martin
Chandler

Black Male

Tyisha
Davis

Black Female

Nho Trong
Nguyen

Asian Male

225

Hispanic
Female

Resume
Information226
Women’s Law
Caucus (law school)
President’s Diversity
Cabinet
(undergraduate)
SBA President (law
school)
Young Republicans
(undergraduate)
Part-time student
(law school)
Student Body
President
(undergraduate)
Phi Gamma Delta
Fraternity228
(undergraduate)
Black Student Union
President
(undergraduate)
Black Lives Matter
organizer (law
school)
Asian Pacific
American Law
Students Association
(law school)

[VOL. 16:2

Interviewer’s
Notes227
Personable,
team-player,
ambitious
Third-generation
lawyer

Selected
for Hire
Yes

First-generation
lawyer
“Well-spoken”

Yes

“well-groomed”

Yes

“Dreadlocks?”

No

“Heavy accent difficult to
understand”

No

Yes

Yes

See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily & Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 1008–09 (2004) (demonstrating
employment bias based on applicant names).
226
Background information gleaned from resumes can form the basis of mental
impressions about a candidate’s diversity that lends itself to both inter- and intraracial distinctions. See id. at 1007 (discussing a study of resumes that demonstrated
employment discrimination based on names).
227
Numerous cues from an in-person interview can be used to create mental
impressions about a candidate’s diversity that lends itself to discriminatory attitudes.
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3 (discussing the way that individuals “whiten”
their names to conform to an institutional value for whiteness).
228
This is not one of the five historically black fraternities. See
http://www.blackgreek.com/divinenine/. Its founders were all white, and its
membership appears to remain predominantly white. See PHIGAM.ORG,
http://www.phigam.org/2016/about/history (last visited Dec. 29, 2016).
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In this hypothetical, both the Black female and the Asian male
not selected would have difficulty establishing a claim for disparate
treatment discrimination on the basis of their race or national origin
under the McDonnell Douglas standard.229 In the first instance, they
would have difficulty demonstrating a prima facie case of
discrimination where the persons selected included both Black and
other ethnic minority candidates, rebutting any presumption that their
non-selection was due to race or national origin.230 Additionally, these
individuals would face an equally difficult burden at the third stage of
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to establish that
unlawful discrimination on the basis of their race, ethnicity or national
origin was the reason for their non-selection, rather than their name,
appearance, accent, or other presumptively lawful considerations.231

229

See supra note 211.
Id. (outlining the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the proof
required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the failure to hire
context).
231
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 143. Names, appearance, or accents
may reasonably be considered performative aspects of race or national origin, but
they are distinguishable from the phenotypical aspects of race or national origin that
are generally subject to protection under Title VII. See id. (discussing the court’s
rejection of accent and appearance discrimination as actionable race or national
origin discrimination under Title VII). For a general discussion of the ways in which
Title VII fails to offer protection against discrimination based on these performative
aspects of race, see Camille G. Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity:
Discrimination By Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004)
(critiquing courts’ failure to recognize performative aspects of race, such as
appearance or accent/language, as subject to protection under Title VII); D. Wendy
Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear in the Workplace: Hijabs
and Natural Hair, 8 FLA. INT’L L. REV. 331 (2013) (arguing for legal recognition
under Title VII of the discrimination suffered by Black and Muslim women from
workplace dress codes that regulate appearance); see also Janet Ainsworth,
Language, Power and Identity in the Workplace, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 233 (2010)
(arguing that Title VII inadequately protects racial minorities from workplace
discrimination based on facile distinctions between voluntary and involuntary
aspects of identity). For a discussion of Carbado and Gulati’s estimation of how
these claims might fair under Title VII, see generally CARBADO & GULATI, supra
note 3, 142–44 (discussing the possibility of asserting a “race-plus” claim of
discrimination, but concluding such a claim is “normatively and theoretically
problematic”).
230
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However, if these candidates’ names, appearance, or accents made
them less desirable to the employer, this would seem to raise a concern
that the employer values only “surface diversity,” a practice that Title
VII ought to proscribe, or at least condemn.232 The outlook might be
different if, rather than trying to remedy individual instances of harm
arising from these identity performance demands under a disparate
treatment theory of liability,233 we target employers who adopt only a
“surface diversity” commitment using a disparate impact theory of
liability.234
Under a disparate impact theory of liability, WDE that reflect
only a commitment to surface diversity ought to be actionable.235 A
disparate impact theory of liability would allow the treatment of
working identity to be considered actionable discrimination because
aggrieved employees need not demonstrate that the employer’s
consideration of working identity amounted to intentional
discrimination. 236 Nor do they need to establish that the dispositive
aspects of working identity are themselves subject to protection under

232

See Lee, supra note 103, at 490.
Disparate treatment liability is difficult to establish for any Title VII plaintiff, not
just those challenging WDE. See generally Martin, supra note 150 (discussing Title
VII’s failure to address “disparate treatment”).
234
See Lee, supra note 103, at 490. Notably, in a search of federal cases adjudicating
WDE, see Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard,
supra note 5, at 2467, the only case identified challenging WDE under a disparate
impact theory of liability was brought by a group of Black employees alleging that
the employers’ effort to ensure proportionate representation at all levels of the
company under a balanced workforce plan had a disparate impact on Black
employees who, under the plan, were considered “overrepresented” in some job
categories. Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 135 (5th Cir. 2003). In reversing
summary judgment for the employer, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a trial on the question of whether the employer’s diversity initiative had a
disparate impact on the Black plaintiffs. Id. While this case does not demonstrate the
viability of a disparate impact theory of liability specifically for disapproving of
“surface diversity,” it does suggest the viability of a disparate impact theory of
liability generally to redress the harms arising from WDE. See id.
235
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (establishing the
standard for proof of disparate impact liability under Title VII).
236
See id. at 432. Under a disparate impact theory of liability, the plaintiff need not
demonstrate that the discrimination was intentional, but may establish liability by
offering proof that a neutral policy was administered or enforced in a manner that
caused women and/or minorities to be adversely and disproportionately affected. Id.
233
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Title VII. 237 Rather, potential plaintiffs would only need to
demonstrate that the employer’s practice of valuing “surface
diversity,” caused an adverse impact on women and racial
minorities.238 This proof of adverse impact would then shift the burden
to the employer to demonstrate that the policy is both job-related and
consistent with business necessity. 239 Even if some instrumental
justification for WDE would suffice to establish their job-relatedness,
it is unlikely that most employers could demonstrate that the particular
practice of valuing only “surface diversity” is necessary to achieve the
instrumental benefits of workplace diversity. 240 To the contrary, if
diversity is valued instrumentally for its ability to signal the openness
of the workplace, or to realize functional or market benefits on behalf
of the employer,241 it necessarily requires employers to embrace not
just those who look different and act the same, but those who are truly
different. 242 In other words, it requires employers to embrace “core
diversity.” 243 Importantly, unlike pursuing a disparate treatment
theory, where liability might signal normative disapproval of WDE by
declaring them presumptively discriminatory, 244 a disparate impact
237

See id. at 436 (“Nothing in the act precludes testing or measuring procedures;
they are obviously useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are a demonstrably reasonable measure of
job performance.”).
238
Id. at 431. Adverse impact is often demonstrated through statistical proof. See id.
Plaintiffs are presumptively able to meet their burden of proving adverse impact if
they are able to demonstrate that the rate of selection among the protected group is
less than four-fifths the rate of selection among the non-protected group. See id. In
the present example, the data set is so small that it might not lend itself to reliable
statistical proof of adverse impact. However, it is clear from the data that the rate of
selection among minority applicants (50%) as compared to the rate of selection
among non-minority applicants (100%) demonstrates the required adverse impact
where the rate of minority selection is less than four-fifths the rate of non-minority
selection.
239
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
240
See infra notes 241–245 and accompanying text.
241
See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the various instrumental
benefits of WDE).
242
See Lee, supra note 103, at 513
243
Id.; see also CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3.
244
See supra note 220 and accompanying text. This chilling effect would be
undesirable because of the potential for WDE, when properly administered, to
improve employment opportunities for and inclusion of women and racial minorities
in the workplace. See supra Part II.B. Legal sanction under these circumstances
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theory of liability simply cautions employers to take care not to pursue
WDE in ways that unduly harm the interests of women and racial
minorities.245
2.

NO Racial & Gender Diversity Preferences

The second concern raised by progressive scholars is that
WDE may limit opportunities for women and racial minorities by
exploiting gender or racial identity for the benefit of the employer, and
to the detriment of employees. 246 It is worth noting that the
opportunities that may be opened up for women and racial minorities
in the workplace as a result of WDE are not insignificant and may
very well enhance equal opportunities for some, even as they may
have the potential to limit opportunities for others.247 However, even if
these efforts might be equally likely to expand opportunities, Title VII
ought to effectively police those WDE that are equality-suppressing.248
would send a strong signal to employers about the impropriety of these efforts, even
if well-intentioned. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing how the
law influences management practice and vice versa through the process of normative
isomorphism).
245
See supra notes 219–220 and accompanying text. Ultimately, because it is really
errant WDE that cause harm, not instrumental diversity in principle, many
progressive scholars have tried to offer prescriptions directed to the narrower project
of restraining WDE rather than the broader project of proscribing them. See, e.g.,
Lee, supra note 103, at 513 (advocating that businesses adopt “core diversity” rather
than “surface diversity” in WDE); Rich, supra note 33, at 47 (conceding that it is
“ineffective diversity management” rather than WDE per se that warrant objection);
Wade, supra note 78, at 1575 (suggesting courts impose a duty of care on employers
adopting WDE); Green, supra note 73, at 613 (suggesting Title VII “harness the
business interests” in diversity to advance antidiscrimination goals). Many of these
prescriptions, however, erroneously assume that the justifications for WDE have to
be modified, rather than simply restricting how they may operate in practice.
246
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
247
See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 39 (acknowledging that WDE might both expand
and limit employment opportunities for women and racial minorities).
248
For example, Skrentny notes that “[i]n occupations as diverse as
advertising/marketing, medicine, teaching, journalism, and policing, employers see
value in matching the race of the employee to the race of the clients or citizens he or
she serves.” Id. at 11. However, as observed by a number of progressive scholars in
their critiques of WDE, an employer would not likely be able to justify the explicit
consideration of race in hiring and assignments under prevailing Title VII standards,
which do not recognize any “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) for race.
See supra note 96. See generally Green, supra note 78.
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In particular, the concern from progressive scholars is that
women or racial minorities, if seen as uniquely qualified to perform
certain jobs by virtue of their gender or race, may be funneled into
career-limiting jobs that are segregated by gender and/or race. 249
Unlike the harms that arise from “racial signaling”, 250 WDE that
attempt to leverage “racial abilities” 251 seem highly amenable to
challenge under a disparate treatment theory, as well as amenable to
proof under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.252 In
contrast to the largely expressive or dignitary harms that may be
suffered by women and racial minorities from racial signaling, WDE
that attempt to leverage racial abilities and that result in the exclusion
of women and/or racial minorities from career-enhancing
opportunities or conversely that restrict them to career-limiting
opportunities, are highly amenable to the kinds of proof necessary to
establish an adverse employment action under the first prong of
McDonnell Douglas, as well as to proof of unlawful race- and genderbased discrimination under the third prong of McDonnell Douglas.253
Again, an example from the literature is instructive. Skrentny,
in his book After Civil Rights: Racial Realism in the New American
Workplace, offers Walgreens as a cautionary tale of the harms that can
arise from WDE that go awry when attempting to leverage “racial
abilities.” 254 Walgreens had a practice of matching Black managers
with stores in Black communities. 255 This was not an attempt to
invidiously discriminate against Black managers.256 Rather, like many
other businesses that recognize the instrumental value of workplace
diversity, Walgreens believed that it could better respond to its
249

See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 39. There is also a concern that this type of job
assignment stereotypes employees. See also id. at 12–13 (describing the stereotypes
on which racially segregated jobs are based). See also Green, supra note 78, at 599.
However, this expressive harm is not amenable to redress under Title VII. But see
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
250
See SKRENTNY supra note 2, at 11.
251
Id.
252
See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
253
Id.
254
See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 87.
255
Id.
256
Id. (noting that the company’s record of hiring and promoting Black managers
was well above the industry average).
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customers if its store managers reflected the diversity of the
communities they served. 257 Even when well-intentioned, however,
WDE raise the possibility that the particular practices adopted by
individual employers may result in suppressing rather than enhancing
opportunities for women and racial/ethnic minorities or reinforcing
rather than disrupting harmful racial and gender stereotypes in the
workplace. 258 As progressive scholars have noted, this is a serious
concern.259
In this instance, problems arose because Walgreens promoted
and compensated managers on the basis of store performance, which
on average was lower in Black communities than in other
neighborhoods.260 The effect was to limit both the compensation and
promotional opportunities of the Black managers assigned to these
Black stores. The EEOC sued Walgreens on behalf of these Black
managers alleging that the practice of assigning store managers based
on race amounted to unlawful race discrimination. 261 Walgreens
settled the EEOC suit for $24 million.262 This case demonstrates that
when WDE go awry in practice, even when well-intentioned in
principle, there is redress available under Title VII.263 It is not difficult

257

Id. In fact, Walgreens alleged that it made these race-based assignments because
community groups had themselves requested that Black managers supervise these
stores. Id. As some progressive scholars have observed, this makes these practices
reminiscent of the “long-discredited customer preferences” that resulted in the
exclusion of race as a BFOQ under Title VII. See Norton, supra note 19, at 562.
258
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 42.
259
See id.; see generally Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell
Douglas Standard, supra note 5 (discussing the risk of liability under Title VII of
various workplace diversity practices, including race- and gender-based selection).
260
See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 87. These practices were even more
objectionable because Walgreens also assigned Black managers to these stores even
when they objected to these assignments. Id. One Black manager, for instance,
complained that although he lived in an affluent, predominantly white neighborhood,
he was assigned to manage a store in a poor Black neighborhood. Id.
261
Id. at 88.
262
Id. See generally Levit, supra note 56 (discussing the considerations that
influence employers to settle class action discrimination suits, including public
pressures).
263
See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 88.
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to understand why these employees would likely have prevailed under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.264
Although the involuntary assignments themselves are not
likely to be actionable as an adverse employment action under Title
VII,265 the negative implications of these assignments for managers’
pay and promotion opportunities certainly would satisfy the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case standard.266 Similarly, the fact
that these assignments were explicitly race-based, even if not
motivated by intentional discrimination or racial animus, would
suffice to satisfy the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.267 On
these facts, Walgreens may not even satisfy its burden at the second
stage of the McDonnell Douglas test to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the assignments.268 Instead, the explicit use
of race to assign managers to stores would likely require Walgreens to
demonstrate a remedial predicate for its actions as required under the
Weber/Johnson cases.269 Because Walgreens’ purpose in making these
explicitly race-based assignments was instrumental (i.e., to better
serve customers), rather than remedial (i.e., to cure a manifest
imbalance in its workforce), it would likely be unable to defend these
assignments under the prevailing Weber/Johnson standard.270 And that
is as it should be.271 Employing explicit racial and gender preferences
264

See Lomack v. Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that fire
department that involuntarily transferred firefighters or otherwise denied transfer
requests based on race without proof of a remedial interest engaged in impermissible
racial discrimination).
265
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; see also Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641–42.
270
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. The Court in Weber required a remedial predicate to
justify racial preferences. Id. But cf. Green, supra note 73, at 617 (noting that Weber
did not foreclose non-remedial goals as a basis for justifying racial preferences under
Title VII).
271
See Norton, supra note 19, at 563. On this point, Norton is correct in suggesting
that racial equality requires employers to screen directly for the skills they seek
rather than to use race as a proxy for these skills. Id. This includes skills that further
an employer’s instrumental diversity interest, including cultural competence or
diversity of experience. Id. After all, the empirical research supporting the functional
benefits of workplace diversity clearly demonstrate that it is not race or gender per
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make WDE more likely to incur the kinds of harms that most concern
progressives.272
Perhaps Walgreen’s seems to be a particularly egregious case.
Perhaps there might be concern that other cases will present a more
challenging set of facts and more difficult prospects for redress of the
legitimate harm women and racial minorities might suffer from WDE
gone awry. A look at the trends from decided diversity cases suggests
such a concern is unwarranted.273 Those cases involving minority and
female plaintiffs challenging WDE under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework have generally been more successful than
those by white or male plaintiffs challenging these same efforts.274 In
particular where employers use explicit racial and/or gender
preferences in ways that are equality-suppressing, rather than equalityenhancing, courts have not displayed the same willingness to presume
the legitimacy of these WDE, but have instead subjected them to more
rigorous scrutiny. 275 These cases suggest that Title VII law and
se that generate these benefits, but the different skills and experiences that inevitably
accompany these different social identities. See Page, supra note 54, at 306–07.
Accordingly, employers should be required to select directly for the skills and
experience they desire, rather than allowing race or gender to serve as a proxy for
them. See id. In this regard, employment decisions are different than college
admissions decisions in which decision-makers often have to rely on limited
information about large numbers of applicants to determine which students to admit.
See Brief for Respondents in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241
& 02-516), 4-5 (describing grades and test scores as “imperfect predictors” of
prospective academic success that are combined with other factors to make
admissions decisions), Brief for Respondents in Fisher v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198
(2016) (No. 11-345), 12-14 (describing the university’s admissions decisions made
on the basis of “a matrix where you don’t know who’s who. Because once they’ve
made a score, you become a number.”)
272
See supra Part III.A.3–4.
273
See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.
274
Id. See generally Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas
Standard, supra note 5.
275 See Hagan v. City of N.Y., 39 F. Supp.3d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying
employer’s motion to dismiss finding plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence that
defendant hired minorities only to quiet complaints of discrimination and not to
promote diversity or to resolve the underlying issues of workplace discrimination);
Epps –Milton v. Genesee Intermed. Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 5817015 (No. 14-11861
(E.D. Mich.) (allowing plaintiff to proceed on race discrimination claim where allege
hired because African American and solely “for appearance of diversity” but then
subjected to differential treatment than white peers); Blakely v. Big Lots Stores, Inc.,
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doctrine can distinguish between WDE that are equality-enhancing,
and those that are instead equality-suppressing by harming them.276
Managerialization of law theory suggests that the process of
normative isomorphism is bi-directional, and just as EEO law has
become managerialized by WDE so too WDE can become more
legalized as Title VII law is interpreted and applied to proscribe those
WDE that incur harms to women and racial/ethnic minorities.277 Title
VII law and doctrine have already proven capable of identifying and
signaling to employers the boundaries between WDE that are equalityenhancing and those that are instead equality-suppressing. 278 By
adopting standards that reflect a proscription on the use of explicit
racial or gender preferences as a part of WDE, and through continued
targeted enforcement against employers who express a commitment
only to “surface diversity,” while generally continuing to approve of
WDE that embody a commitment to “core diversity,” Title VII law
and doctrine can ensure that it has the same normative influence on the
managerial practice of diversity that managerial practice has had on
EEO law.279
2014 WL 4261239 (No. 2:10 CV 342 (N.D. Ind.) (denying summary judgment to
employer on white female plaintiff’s claim that she was fired for refusing to refrain
from hiring black employees and instead increase hiring of white employees to
“diversify” the store).
276
Several cases involving minorities who were harmed by explicitly race-based
employment decisions have resulted in favorable decisions for plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Frank v. Xerox, 347 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 2003) (reversing grant of summary judgment
for employer finding that employees raised triable issue of fact regarding whether
the employer’s diversity plan limiting promotional opportunities because Blacks
were “overrepresented” in certain job categories was unlawful); Lomack v. Newark,
463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing judgment for employer and entering
judgment for employees who were involuntarily transferred in order eliminate
segregation in fire houses); Sinio v. McDonalds Corp., 2007 WL 869553 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (denying summary judgment for employer and finding triable issue of fact on
whether diversity efforts that helped African American employees but not Asian
female plaintiff was lawful).
277
Edelman, When Organizations Rule, supra note 150, at 902–03.
278
See supra notes 275-276 and accompanying text.
279
This normative isomorphic force has already been demonstrated, for instance, in
the area of sexual harassment law where cases like Burling Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), have
established a standard of vicarious liability for supervisor harassment where
employers fail to prevent and promptly correct workplace harassment. These cases
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CONCLUSION

Progressive scholars have often been the fiercest critics of
WDE, believing them to be fundamentally in tension with the
egalitarian goals that underlie Title VII. This critique may be
misguided, not only normatively when WDE are viewed in the context
of their EEO origins, but also descriptively in view of the benefits that
often accrue to women and racial minorities from WDE, which
include expanded employment opportunities and more inclusive
workplaces. Rather than viewing WDE as antagonistic to the project
of workplace equality, therefore, progressives ought to recognize
WDE for their potential, if appropriately circumscribed by Title VII
law and doctrine, to aid in securing the long sought ideal of workplace
equality. In this regard, the focus of Title VII law and doctrine should
not be on proscribing the instrumental justifications for WDE, but on
policing the boundaries between those WDE that are equalityenhancing and those that are, or have the potential to be, equalitysuppressing. By approving of the former and signaling disapproval of
the latter, Title VII can prevent WDE from incurring the kinds of
harms that most concern progressive scholars and operate not only in
service to businesses’ legitimate instrumental concerns but also aid in
the advancement of workplace equality.

have given rise to the near universal adoption by employers of anti-harassment
policies (and in many cases training) that seek to ensure compliance with this
standard. Whether or not these policies are effective in preventing and correcting
workplace harassment, see Edelman, When Organizations Rule, supra note 150, at
934 (questioning the efficacy of these policies in practice), the legal standards
developed in these cases have certainly influenced managerial practice in this regard.

